

PRAMĀṆAKĪRṬIḤ

PAPERS DEDICATED TO ERNST STEINKELLNER
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 70th BIRTHDAY

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Prajñākaragupta on *pratītyasamutpāda* and reverse causation¹

Eli Franco, Leipzig

“The spiritual place of the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism” does not look like an epoch-making paper. It is the relatively short text of a lecture held in Kyoto, for the most part quoting and summarising previous studies by other scholars, and it makes no claim to originality, but subscribes to Tilmann Vetter’s conclusions as presented in *Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti*. Yet what a tremendous impact this paper had on a whole generation of Buddhist scholars! It gave them (myself included) a sense of purpose, direction and vision. In a few masterful strokes, Steinkellner explained the final aim of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition, opened new meaningful perspectives and reintegrated philosophically oriented work on Buddhism within the larger framework of Buddhist studies.²

Personally, I am most grateful to the “Jubilar” for this paper and for much more. When I began my work on Buddhist philosophy of religion, especially

¹ My thanks, as always, to my wife Karin Preisendanz for reading this paper so thoroughly and thoughtfully.

² It would be an interesting task for the historian of modern Buddhist studies to follow the occasional process of estrangement between Buddhist *pramāṇa* studies and Buddhist studies in general. When and to what extent did such a rift arise? (It is clear, for instance, that in his time a scholar like Stcherbatsky was considered a central figure among scholars of Buddhism and his *Buddhist Logic* a monument in Buddhist studies.) Was it the influence of analytical philosophy that led to the sturdy division between “Buddhist philosophy” and “Buddhist religion”? Or was it the emerging influence of Religious Studies and the concept of religion, à la Rudolf Otto and his idea of the Holy, as consisting above all in a mystical and ineffable experience? Or is it simply the fact that *pramāṇa* studies became so technical and demanding that many scholars could no longer see how, say, the incredibly complex enquiries about *vyāpti* or *apoha* might be of any relevance to Buddhist spiritual values?

on the *Pramānasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, the above-mentioned paper and other studies by Steinkellner helped me to organize and articulate my thoughts and place my understanding of Buddhist philosophical texts in a broader cultural context. For this, and for unfailing support for more than twenty-five years, I remain enormously indebted to him and am well aware that the following contribution is only a small token of gratitude for a debt I cannot repay.

One of the central questions that Steinkellner raised in “The spiritual place,” and which will also engage me in the present paper, concerns the relationship between Buddhist logic and epistemology and the Buddhist religion. Is the religious background of Buddhist logic and epistemology decisive for the development of this tradition? Can Buddhist logic be understood only in relation to the Buddhist religion? Further, since the Buddha was considered to be the ultimate means of knowledge not only in religious matters but also in matters of logic, is there a vicious circle at the very foundation of the logical-epistemological enterprise? Namely, is the authority of the Buddha established by Buddhist epistemology and the validity of Buddhist epistemology by the authority of the Buddha?³

It is quite clear that the identification of the epistemological tradition as external to Buddhism (i.e., as not specifically Buddhist, just like grammar, architecture, medicine or dialectics)⁴ cannot account for the complex and multifaceted works of this tradition.⁵ One promising way to bring to light the relationship between religion and epistemology is to examine cases where there is a conflict between them, for there we can see more clearly how they stand in

³ This is another topic where I am directly indebted to Steinkellner. Cf. Franco, “Two Circles,” Steinkellner, “Once More On Circles.”

⁴ Cf. MSA 11.60: *pañcavidhaṃ vidyāsthānam. adhyātmavidyā hetuvidyā śabdavidyā cikitsāvidyā śilpasthānakarmavidyā*. Cf. also Ruegg, *Ordre spirituel et ordre temporel*, pp. 101ff.

⁵ It is clear that the Buddhist *pramāṇa* works contain much more than “dialectics” (*hetuvidyā* and similar expressions) and can in no way be reduced to it (although this was sometimes done because the *pramāṇa* tradition originally developed out of dialectics). Furthermore, it is indeed doubtful whether the other “external sciences” can be unequivocally so labelled. Is Buddhist architecture part of Buddhism? If it is not, should one also introduce a distinction between Buddhist culture or Buddhist civilisation and Buddhist religion? And if so, where is the borderline between the two? If grammar is used to understand and interpret the Buddha’s word, is it internal or external to Buddhist “science”? And so on.

relation to each other. Is the one subordinate to the other? Is human reason autonomous, or must it rely on the superior insight of the Buddha and the eternal truths as formulated in the Buddhist sacred writings? Can the entire Buddhist doctrine be logically or rationally demonstrated, or does one have to accept some parts of it on blind faith? Should Buddhist logic be used only to defend and justify religious beliefs, or can it also be used to modify them? And if the latter is the case, to what extent and in what way can such modification be undertaken?

In the following I will attempt to shed some light on these issues with reference to a particular case, namely, the interpretation of the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) by Prajñākaragupta.

Before entering the topic of my investigation, let me briefly outline the background and context of the discussion. One of the most important tasks for the Buddhist logicians was to provide a rational justification of the Buddhist religion. However, they had to face the problem that not all components of the Buddha's teaching can be rationally justified. For instance, because past lives usually cannot be remembered, the law of karma cannot be immediately verified, let alone its intricacies brought to light.⁶ Such parts of the Buddha's doctrine can neither be directly perceived nor inferred. They had to be substantiated indirectly by way of the establishment of the trustworthiness of the speaker, that is, of the Buddha himself. This problem is not particularly Buddhist; it was also dealt with by other philosophical traditions such as Nyāya⁷ and Vedānta,⁸ and other religious traditions such as Śaivism.⁹ An important presupposition for reliability, not only in the Buddha's case, but also in the case of a God like Śiva or of the Rishis who revealed the Veda, consists in great compassion. However, in the Buddha's case, unlike in the case of an eternal God or the primordial Rishis, such compassion cannot be innate, but has to be practised over many lives. Thus, the proof of the Buddha's reliability presup-

⁶ Cf. Vetter, *Der Buddha*, p. 40, n. 1; Van Bijlert, *Epistemology*, p. 119; Tillemans, *Persons of Authority*, p. 38 and n. 12; Franco, *Dharmakīrti*, pp. 34–35.

⁷ Cf. NBh 556.2–567.7 and NV thereon.

⁸ Cf. van Beutenen, *Āgamaprāmāṇyam*; Rastelli, “Von der Offenbarung Gottes.”

⁹ Cf. SBhT 35.9–10.

poses the Buddha's unlimited compassion, which presupposes, in its turn, a doctrine of rebirth.¹⁰

In addition, the Buddhist logicians, from Dharmakīrti onwards, had to demonstrate that the process of rebirth occurs in the manner assumed by the Buddhists, that is, without the assumption of a permanent soul that repeatedly takes up new lives in various bodies. This meant that they had to argue, on the one hand, against the Brahminical philosophers who attempted to demonstrate the existence of a permanent soul and who claimed that rebirth is impossible without assuming its existence.¹¹ On the other hand, the Buddhist logicians had to argue against the materialists who denied the very possibility of rebirth. The materialist philosophers argued that the body is the base or support of consciousness and that therefore, when the body is destroyed, consciousness is also destroyed. Consciousness cannot survive without a body, nor move on to another body, just as a fresco which is supported by a wall cannot survive without the wall, nor move on to another wall; or just as the colour of a mango fruit cannot exist without the mango, nor move on to another mango when the fruit has been destroyed.¹²

The Buddhist response to such objections was to establish the autonomy of the mind, that is, to show that consciousness is independent of the body, or of the particular parts of the body that are traditionally associated with the phenomenon of life, notably, the sense faculties and breath.¹³

By showing that consciousness, especially mental awareness in contradistinction to sense perception, is independent of factors such as the body, breath and the senses, Dharmakīrti and his followers attempted to establish a causal nexus amongst moments of consciousness, namely, every moment of consciousness has to be produced by the preceding moment of consciousness. Thus, from the present moment of consciousness one can infer its cause, the previous moment of consciousness; and from that moment of consciousness its cause, and so on until one reaches the first moment of consciousness in this life. But this moment of consciousness too has to be the result of an anterior moment of consciousness. And that anterior moment of consciousness cannot

¹⁰ This is another area of study in which Steinkellner did some ground-breaking work, notably in his two monographs on the proof of rebirth (*paralokasiddhi*) by Dharmottara and Prajñāśena.

¹¹ On Dharmakīrti's response cf. Franco, *Dharmakīrti*, Chap. 5.

¹² Cf. Franco, *ibid.*, Chap. 4.

¹³ Cf. Taber, "Dharmakīrti Against Physicalism."

but be the last moment of consciousness in a previous life. The same reasoning applies, of course, to the sequence of moments of consciousness in the previous life, and thus one can infer the life before the previous one. In this way an infinite number of previous lives are inferred.

However, the Buddhist logicians want to prove not only past lives,¹⁴ but also future lives; otherwise, all religious striving would be futile. At this point there arises a problem in connection with the Buddhist doctrine of inference: By means of an inference based on causal relations, one can infer only past causes because according to Dharmakīrti and his followers one can infer the cause from the effect, but not the effect from the cause. For example, one can infer fire from smoke, but not from fuel. Something can always occur to prevent a cause from producing its effect.

How then can future lives be proved?¹⁵ According to the Buddhist logicians, only two types of inference are considered valid. The one, just mentioned, is from effect to cause. The other is based on the own-being of things, that is, on an essential property. The common example for this type of inference is: This is a tree, because it is an Aśoka tree.¹⁶ In this inference one infers from one essential property, such as being an Aśoka tree, another essential property, such as being a tree, that always occurs together with the former property. Both properties belong to the same thing in reality.

If we were to conduct an opinion poll among all Buddhist logicians who attempt to prove future lives, all but one would say that future lives can only be proved with an inference based on an essential property. Prajñākaragupta stands alone in claiming that one should infer future lives with an inference based on causality.¹⁷ The audacity of this counter-intuitive position is clear: If

¹⁴ For the proof of the Buddha's compassion as a condition or a presupposition for his reliability, which forms the context of the discussion of rebirth in the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, a proof of past life would suffice.

¹⁵ Cf. PVABh 67.19–21 (Ms. 26b1–2): *yadi vijñānapūrvakaṃ vijñānam* tathāpi janmādivijñānāt pūrvakajanmavijñānam iti pratīyate.** tasya tatkāryatvāt. bhāvijanma-vijñānam tu kuto 'numīyate? atha samarthakāraṇadarśanāt kāryānumānam. tat tarhi hetvantaram prasaktaṃ kāraṇalakṣaṇam.*

* P_(Pe) 70b2 = P_(De) 59a4, however, has no equivalent to *vijñānam*: *gal te rnam par śes pa sñon du 'gro ba can yin pa de lta na yañ /.*

** S.: *pratīyatām.*

¹⁶ The classical formulations of this doctrine can be found, of course, in Steinkellner, *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II, p. 40ff., and *Hetubindu* p. 5.4ff.

¹⁷ Of course his opinion is endorsed by his commentators Yamāri and Jayanta.

one infers from the present moment of consciousness *as an effect* a future moment of consciousness *as its cause*, this means that the future is the cause of something present, or that something present is produced by something future. How could that be?

Moreover, Prajñākaragupta presents this opinion as Dharmakīrti's own understanding because the entire discussion appears in the form of a comment on *Pramāṇavārttika* II 49:

sattopakāriṇī yasya nityam tadanubandhataḥ |
sa hetuḥ saptamī tasmād utpādād iti cocyate ||

The cause is that whose existence always assists [in the arising of the effect] due to the [effect's constant] attachment to it.

For this [reason the Buddha uses] the locative [case-ending in the formula *asmin satīdam bhavati* 'When this is present, that arises'] and [for exactly the same reason he uses the ablative case-ending when] it is said 'because of the arising' [in the formula *asyotpādād idam utpadyate* 'Because of the arising of this, that arises'].¹⁸

Thus, Prajñākaragupta further assumes this doctrine to be not only Dharmakīrti's, but also the Buddha's own in his general formulation of Dependent Origination.

Now let me take a closer look at this highly original, fascinating and counterintuitive interpretation of Dependent Origination. This interpretation does not concern the nature of any of the twelve members of the causal chain. Rather, it is the causal connection between them that is given a new dimension.

The discussion begins with a distinction between two kinds of causes. The word *hetu* is used for a special kind of cause (*viśiṣṭa kāraṇa*) as defined by Dharmakīrti in the above-quoted verse. The other kind of cause is a mere "helper" (*upakāraka*);¹⁹ it is occasional or accidental to the effect in the sense that even if it is absent, the effect can arise from something else. The body is

¹⁸ Cf. Franco, *Dharmakīrti*, p. 227.

¹⁹ Cf. PVABh 66.8, v. 427 (Ms. 25b7):

nopakāraka ity eva hetus tasya ni(r)vartakaḥ |*
viśiṣṭam eva hetutvaṃ kāryasya vini(r)vartakaṃ ||

* Read *nirvartakaḥ*, *vinirvartakam* and *nirvartakatvam* here and in the subsequent lines, against Ms. 25b7 and the Tibetan translation (P_(Pe) 69a2 = P_(De) 57b7: *zlog byed, zlog par byed pa*, and *zlog par byed pa ñid*).

such a cause for the series or succession of moments of consciousness (*citta-santati*). Thus, such a succession can occur even without the body.²⁰

An opponent objects that Dharmakīrti's definition cannot be true. The Buddha did not define causal relationships the way Dharmakīrti does. The Buddha characterized causal relationships in the form of Dependent Origination. If Dharmakīrti's formulation were true, surely the Buddha, who is the final authority in matters of causation,²¹ would not have failed to communicate to us something so important and useful.²² How can one reconcile the rigorous definition of a cause formulated by Dharmakīrti with the traditional canonical formulation? Prajñākaragupta bridges the gap between the two formulations by interpreting the locative case-ending in the first formulation as expressing a cause.²³ According to this interpretation, *asmin sati* would have to be translated "because of this existing" or "because of this being present."

The use of the locative of cause (*nimittasaptamī*) is relatively rare, but certainly not unknown. A well-known verse is often quoted by the Sanskrit grammarians to illustrate this particular usage of the locative, in which all the words indicating cause, namely, skin, tusks, hair and scrotum, appear in the locative:

²⁰ Cf. PVABh 66.13–17 (Ms. 25b8–26a1): *yasya tu kadācid upakārasāmarthyam tad-abhāve 'pi kadācid upakāro 'nyato 'pi bhavati, viśeṣalakṣaṇaḥ sa nityam anuvartako na bhavatīti yuktam. * na tannivṛtṭyāpi** tannivṛtṭiḥ. dehasya ca sattā na sarvadopakāriṇī, pūrvacittamātravikāre*** 'pi kadācid vikāradṛṣṭeḥ. tato dehābhāve 'pi kadācid cittavikāravihitavikāratvāt tadupastambhād āstaiva**** cittasantatir iti saṃbhāvvyate.*

* *yuktam* absent in Ms and S, but cf. P_(Pe) 69a6 = P_(De) 58a4: *rigs so.*

** Perhaps *tannivṛtṭāv api?* P_(Pe) 69a6 = P_(De) 58a4: *de ni ldog kyañ de ldog pa ma yin no.*

*** P_(Pe) 69a7 = P_(De) 58a5, however, lacks an equivalent to *-mātra-*.

**** Ms. and S.: *āsta eva.*

²¹ An ordinary human being cannot apprehend causal relationship pervasively because such an apprehension presupposes the knowledge of all individuals, past, present and future.

²² Cf. PVABh 67.11–14 (Ms. 26a7–8): *nanu asmin satīdam bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyata ity etad eva hetulakṣaṇam bhagavatoktam. na tu sadānuvartakam aparam vicāritam. bhagavān eva ca paramārthataḥ kāryakāraṇabhāve pāramarṭhikam pramāṇam vyāpyanvayavyatirekagrahaṇād iti pratipāditam. na ca sambhavy upakāravān artho nocyate bhagavatā.*

²³ PVABh 67.16–17 (Ms. 26a8–26b1): *asmin satīdam bhavatīti sadānuvartanam āha. satīti nimittasaptamī. anyathā tadabhāve 'pi bhavane na tannimittako 'sya bhāvah.*

*carmaṇi dvīpinam hanti dantayor hanti kuñjaram /
keṣeṣu camarīm hanti sīmni puṣkalako hataḥ //*

One kills a leopard because of its skin; one kills an elephant because of its tusks. One kills the female yak because of the hair [of its tail]; the musk deer is killed because of its scrotum.²⁴

It is interesting to note that Prajñākaragupta was not the first to interpret the locative case ending in the Dependent Origination formula as the locative of cause. This interpretation was already proposed by Devendrabuddhi,²⁵ and thus it may go back to Dharmakīrti himself. Whatever the case may be, Devendrabuddhi certainly relies on an older tradition, which still needs to be traced. While commenting on the member *vijñāna* in his *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, Vasubandhu suggests the locative of cause as an alternative explanation of the compound *tajja*: *yaṅ na de'i ched du skyes pa ni de skyed źes rgyu mtshan gyi bdun pa yin pa'i phyir te*.²⁶ As translated by Muroji (p. 149): “Oder aber ‘*tajja*’ bedeutet ‘zu diesem Zweck entstanden’ (*de'i ched du skyes pa*), weil [*tad* im *tatpuruṣa*-Kompositum im Sinne eines] Lokativ[s] des Zweckes [zu verstehen ist].”²⁷ Vasubandhu then quotes the above verse with an interesting variant in *pāda* d. Instead of “the musk deer is killed because of its scrotum” one reads “the adulterer is killed because of a woman/wife” (*bud med phyir ni byi pho bsad*).

The use of the locative of cause in Pāli is also very rare. Von Hinüber, who investigated the Buddhist formulas in their relationship to non-Buddhist literature, pointed out that the use of the locative of cause is one of the most important indications or signs of an early oral tradition that ran parallel to the Veda, and to which both the Sanskrit Epics and the Jātaka-stories go back.²⁸ However, according to a personal communication from von Hinüber, we do not find that in the Pāli canon the locative of cause is related to the *pratītyasamutpāda* formulation.

In this connection, one has to consider whether Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta and others may insist on understanding the locative in *asmin sati* as *nimittasaptamī* because they understood it to convey a special type of cause

²⁴ Cf. MBh 2.3.36; cf. also KV 1.1.57.

²⁵ PVP_(De) 25b6: *rgyu mtshan gyi bdun pa*. Cf. also PVT_(De) 96b3–4.

²⁶ Cf. Muroji, *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, p. 70.

²⁷ Note, however, that in this context Vasubandhu refers to the relationship between *vijñāna* and *manaskāra*, not between *vijñāna* and *saṃskāra*.

²⁸ Cf. von Hinüber, *Untersuchungen zur Mündlichkeit*, pp. 31–34, esp. p. 32.

rather than a cause in general. Renou translates *nimittasaptamī* as “locatif de raison d’être, de mobile,”²⁹ which indicates a specific idea of a cause. In the verse quoted above, the locatives can easily be translated as conveying a purpose (one kills a leopard for its skin, for the sake of its skin, etc.). Kaiyaṭa’s interpretation of *nimittasaptamī*, according to which *nimitta* here means *kriyā-phala* “the fruit/result of action,” or to follow Joshi and Roodbergen’s translation, “a motive,”³⁰ points in the same direction. However, this interpretation seems to be unduly narrow. I assume that it was construed by Kaiyaṭa on the basis of the examples given in the verse, which do not exhaust the actual use of *nimittasaptamī*; the word *nimitta* itself is certainly not restricted to this meaning. Further, because of the use of the instrumental case ending to convey the result of action (e.g., in a sentence such as *vetanena dhānyaṃ lunāti*, “he reaps corn for wages”), Kaiyaṭa restricts the use of *nimittasaptamī* even further to cases of intimate connection like the part-whole relation. This is a possible, but certainly not necessary interpretation of *Vārttika* 6, *nimittāt karmasamyoge* (“After [a word standing for] a *nimitta*, when there is a connection [between it and] the object of the action, [the seventh case ending should be used].”)

Kaiyaṭa’s restriction of the use of the *nimittasaptamī* seems to be artificially construed. In any case, in the variant of *pāda* d that is found in Vasubandhu’s *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, the locative does not seem to be used in the sense of a purpose (“Zweck”) or motive. It would be odd to translate the *pāda* as “the adulterer is killed for/for the purpose of/for the sake of a wife/woman.”³¹

Speijer begins with a very broad definition of *nimittasaptamī* and then narrows it down:³² “As the locative often denotes the spot, towards which there is some movement, so it may be used to a very large extent to signify the person or thing, *towards which* some action is directed, in other terms, that *on account of which* something is done” (italics in the original). I am not sure that “towards which” and “on account of which” are really equivalent, but I think that Speijer is correct to suggest a broad interpretation of *nimittasaptamī*; “on account of which” does not only mean “for the sake of” but also “by reason of, because of” in general. On the next page (p. 112), Speijer glosses *nimittasaptamī* as “locative of motive, locative of reference.” It is the locative of reference, rather

²⁹ Cf. Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale*, p. 177.

³⁰ Cf. Joshi and Roodbergen, *Vibhaktiāhnikā*, p. 85.

³¹ Such an interpretation would imply that the adulterer is killed in order to get the woman/wife back.

³² Cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, p. 111.

than of motive, that accounts for the locative qualification of nouns such as *sauhr̥da*, *abhilāṣa*, *kṛpā* and *viśvāsa* (to which, of course, we may add *pramāṇa*). The genitive is, obviously, concurrent.

The usage of the term *nimittasaptamī* by Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta obviously does not imply an understanding of *nimitta* as referring to a teleological cause. If this were the case, one would have to translate the general formulation of Dependent Origination as “This arises for the sake of that,” and its application to the individual members as “The *saṃskāras* arise for the sake/purpose of *avidyā*,” and so on. Therefore, in the present context a distinction between a teleological cause and other kinds of causes does not seem to have been made in connection with the term *nimittasaptamī*. If a distinction is at all implied, it would be the distinction between a main cause that is always connected to the effect (*hetu* as defined by Dharmakīrti above) and a mere “helper” (*upakāraka*) that is occasional.

Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation is probably not faithful to the literal meaning of the formulation of Dependent Origination because it is more natural to interpret *asmin sati* as a locative absolute (*satsaptamī*). Yet, at first sight, the interpretation does not seem to do great harm to the original intention of the formulation. After all, the statement in the locative absolute “when this is present” was in all probability meant to convey the idea of a cause. Why is it so important not only for Prajñākaragupta, but also for Devendrabuddhi to interpret the locative as a locative of cause? The answer, I think, is clear. If one interprets the locative as expressing a condition, there is a contradiction between the canonical formulation and Dharmakīrti’s doctrine of inference. If one says, “When A is present, B arises,” one implies that B necessarily arises when A is present. In other words, A is a sufficient condition for B. For Dharmakīrti, however, the cause is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the effect, and the effect is thereby a sufficient condition for the cause. Put in a locative absolute, Dharmakīrti’s doctrine has to be expressed as follows: “When this (*effect*) is present, that (*cause*) arises/has arisen.” This is the exact opposite of the canonical formulation.

The case of the ablative formulation of Dependent Origination is less problematic for Dharmakīrti and his followers and is, therefore, discussed very briefly. The ablative case-ending in the word *utpādāt* (“because of the arising”) in the formula *asyotpādād idam utpadyate* conveys that from which a separation (*apādāna*)³³ of the agent by way of the verbal action takes place. If this action is the action of arising, that from which the separation of the agent of

³³ Cf. MBh 2.3.28: *apādāne pañcamī*.

arising takes place is the source, and the source may be easily interpreted as the cause in general.³⁴

So far Prajñākaragupta's analysis is more detailed, but not significantly different from Devendrabuddhi's. However, at this point he suggests an alternative explanation. Let us bear in mind Dharmakīrti's definition of a cause. This definition does not address the temporal direction of the causal relationship; nothing in it points to a necessary precedence of the cause to the effect. This enables Prajñākaragupta to claim that the cause can sometimes lie in the future, and that one can therefore infer a future life by means of an inference from its present effect, a regular inference based on a causal relation.

How should one understand this statement? One possibility is to assume that Prajñākaragupta relies on one of the Sarvāstivāda theories of time. The sources speak of four different Sarvāstivāda theories of time that explain in what manner past and future things can be said to exist.³⁵ However, there is no need to enter into this topic here because, as far as I can see, there is no direct reference to any of the Sarvāstivāda doctrines in Prajñākaragupta's discussion here.³⁶

Rather than relying on a special scholastic metaphysics, Prajñākaragupta utilizes a popular belief for his purpose, namely, the belief in omens. He maintains that according to the beliefs or everyday practice of all people (*sarvalokavyavahāra*), it is not the good omens, such as special transformations of the mind, which cause some good fortune (*udaya*, *abhyudaya*, *dge legs*) in the

³⁴ Cf. PVABh 67.17–18 (Ms 26b1): *pañcamy apādāne 'pādānatā ca janikartuḥ prabhava iti. prabhavaś ca nimitam eva*. Prajñākaragupta combines here two different, though similar sūtras: 1.4.30: *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*, and 1.4.31: *bhuvah prabhavaḥ*. The examples given for these usages of the ablative case-ending are 1) "The scorpion arises / is born from cowdung," and 2) "The Ganga springs up / originates from the Himalaya" ("The Vitastā springs up / originates from Kashmir"). In the first case the ablative case-ending denotes the source in the sense of the matter from which or out of which an effect arises, in the second case it denotes the source as a point of departure.

³⁵ These four theories are often referred to, e.g., already by Stcherbatsky in *Central Conception*, pp. 78–80.

³⁶ However, as I pointed out elsewhere, in the context of yogic perception one can detect certain similarities between Prajñākaragupta's statements and those of Buddhadeva; thus the possibility of a certain influence of Buddhadeva should be borne in mind. On the other hand, it is quite clear that in the final analysis Prajñākaragupta relies on idealistic Yogācāra metaphysics as the foundation of his doctrine of time. Note also that the Sarvāstivāda allows simultaneous causation, but not reverse causation; cf. Yao, *Self-cognition*, p. 73.

future, rather the future good fortune causes the good omens in the present. For people say that some good fortune must happen because otherwise there would be no transformation of the mind, etc. In other cases too, one determines something as a cause in this manner.³⁷

It may be objected that according to Dharmakīrti's definition (PV II 49 quoted above), a cause is something that assists in the arising of an effect, and that a future thing cannot assist because it does not yet exist at the time of the arising. To this Prajñākaragupta replies that there would also not be a cause in the past, because a past cause no longer exists at the time of the arising of the effect.³⁸ What is the difference between inexistence because something has already perished and inexistence because something has not yet arisen?

The opponent can also not claim that the cause must immediately precede its effect. In many cases it can be observed that the cause is separated from the effect by an interval of time. Prajñākaragupta uses here the example of two awarenesses occurring before and after deep sleep without dreams.³⁹

³⁷ Cf. PVABh 67.28–68.2 (Ms. 26b3–4) (my punctuation differs from Sāṅkṛtyāyana's):
*kāraṇaṃ kathaṃ kāryaṃ iti cet, na tasya kāryatvāt. tathā hi
 vikāraś cetaṇādīnāṃ udayādeḥ prasādhakāḥ |
 tadvikāratayekṣyante* tac ca kāryatvam ucyate || 435||
 ayaṃ vikāra eva na syāt, yady abhyudayaena na bhavitavyam. tatkrto 'yaṃ vikāra** iti
 sakalalokavyavahāraḥ. etāvataivānyatrāpi kāryatvam. bhāvi kathaṃ kāraṇaṃ? tad-
 avyabhicārād eva.*

* Ms: -kṣyente ** tavyaṃ tatkrto 'yaṃ vikāra illegible in Ms.

³⁸ Cf. PVABh 68.3–5 (Ms. 26b4–5): *nanu ya upakārī sa kāraṇaṃ kathaṃ ca bhāvya avidyamānaṃ upakārī? atītaṃ tarhi kāraṇaṃ na prāpnoti. tad apy asan nopakārīti.* My punctuation here differs from Sāṅkṛtyāyana's.

³⁹ Cf. PVABh 68.11 (Ms. 26b6–7):

*gāḍhasuptasya vijñānaṃ prabodhe pūrvavedanāt |
 jāyate vyavadhāne ('pi)* kāleneti viniścitam || 436*

* S.: *vyavadhānena*. This verse is quoted in NBhū 501.8–9 which also reads *vyavadhāne 'pi*.

It is not clear to me how this statement is compatible with the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* because this *vijñāna* is supposed to exist in deep sleep as well; cf. Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, p. 36. Perhaps this statement is directed at an opponent who does not accept the *ālayavijñāna*, and thus cannot use it to bridge the gap between the two moments of awareness before and after deep sleep, but Prajñākaragupta seems to endorse the statement and not only consider it a *prasaṅga*. Besides, even a Sautrāntika opponent may account for the causality in spite of the time difference by the assumption of *bījas* deposited in the body or the senses. Perhaps I did not understand this argument properly.

However, the opponent is far from being convinced. The general formulation of Dependent Origination implies that the cause precedes the effect. For instance, when the Buddha says “From the arising of this, that arises,” he is pointing out that “the arising of this” takes place before “the arising of that.” Similarly, when the Buddha says “*asmin satīdam bhavati*,” he is pointing out that “*ayam*” exists before “*idam*.”⁴⁰ In other words, should it not be assumed that the general formulation of Dependent Origination contains not only a definition of a cause as something that is invariably concomitant with an effect, but also indicates that the cause exists before the effect? According to the opponent, the locative and ablative case-endings indicate a time prior to the one conveyed by the nominative case-ending.⁴¹ Prajñākaragupta replies in the negative; the locative and ablative case-endings refer to a cause, not to a specific time.⁴²

The opponent also questions whether a present participle such as *sat* (existing) can refer to a future object, or whether the word “arising” can refer to something not yet arisen, but here again Prajñākaragupta points out the symmetry between past and future things inasmuch as both do not exist in the present.⁴³

At this point Prajñākaragupta suggests an alternative explanation of *asmin satīdam bhavati*, according to which the characteristic of the being or arising (*bhāva*) of the one is due to the being or arising of the other.⁴⁴ The purpose of

⁴⁰ How should the locative be translated in this case? Since the possibility of locative absolute is raised only later in the text, the locative here is either *nimittasaptamī* or a normal locative (*adhikaraṇasaptamī*).

⁴¹ Cf. PVABh 68.18 (Ms. 26b8):

saptamyā pūrvabhāvasya pañcamyā ca nidarśanam |
parabhāvaḥ prathamayā tato 'pi ca nidarśyate || 438

⁴² Cf. PVABh 68.21–22 (Ms. 27a1): *na khalu saptamyā pūrvabhāvasyopadarśanam pañcamyā vā. nimittatvamātratvasyopadarśanāt*. etannimittako 'yam ity arthaḥ.*

* Delete at least one *tva*? P_(Pe) 71b6 = P_(De) 60a4: *rgyu mtshan tsam žig ñe bar bstan pa'i phyir te l.*

⁴³ Cf. PVABh 68.24–26 (Ms. 27a1–2): *nanu satīti kathaṃ bhāvī vyapadiśyate tasyāvidyamānatvād evaṃvyapadeśānupapatteḥ? tathā cotpādo* 'nutpannasya. nanv atītasyāpi kathaṃ sattā yenāsau satīti vyapadiśyate? vinaṣṭasya ca katham utpādaḥ?*

* Ms and S.: *tathā notpādo*; cf. P_(Pe) 71b8 = P_(De) 60a5: *de bzin du ma skyes pa la skyes pa yan iio že na l.*

⁴⁴ Cf. PVABh 68.27–28 (Ms: 27a2): *athavā asmin satīdam bhavatīti yasya ca* bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam ity anena saptamī.*

this alternative is not stated explicitly. Perhaps Prajñākaragupta wants to bring the locative and ablative formulations into line with one another. For according to the locative formulation, the cause is the thing itself; according to the ablative formulation, it is the arising of the thing. Or perhaps Prajñākaragupta tries to account for the word *sati*, which is somewhat superfluous when assuming a *nimittasaptamī*. Whatever the case may be, this interpretation does not change the main point, namely, that the locative case ending conveys only a causal relation, not existence at a certain time.⁴⁵ The same holds good, of course, for the ablative formulation (*utpādāt*). It does not convey any division of time, and therefore a time difference, between the objects referred to by the ablative and the nominative, because case endings do not prescribe a certain time, but communicate that the object referred to by the noun is simply a causal factor (*kāraakatvamātra*) for the action referred to by the verb.⁴⁶

In this context, Prajñākaragupta repeats the example of omens, this time referring to bad omens (*ariṣṭa*).⁴⁷ It is commonly said (*vyavahāra*) among people that an omen of death (*ariṣṭa*) is prompted or caused (*prayukta*, *byas*) by death. In other words, a bad omen is not the cause of misfortune, but its result. This implies that the misfortune that awaits us in the future is causing the ill omen in the present.⁴⁸

To fully appreciate the force of Prajñākaragupta's argument we must recall the importance of omens in South Asian culture. The belief in omens, good or bad, has been widely spread in all time periods. The earliest sources for the

* *ca* should probably be deleted. It does not make sense and has no equivalence in P_(Pe) 72a1 = P_(De) 60a6: *yañ na 'di yod na 'di 'byuñ ño źes bya ba* (Pe: *ba la*) *gañ gis dños pos dños po mtshon pa źes bya ba 'dis bdun pa yin no*.

⁴⁵ Cf. PVABh 68.28–29 (Ms. 27a2): *tataḥ satīty anena nimittabhāvamātraṃ lakṣyate. na tu tadā sattvam*.

⁴⁶ Cf. PVABh 68.31–32 (Ms. 27a3): *na cotpādād iti kālavibhāgaḥ. na khalu vibhakta-yaḥ kālaviśeṣavidhāyinyaḥ kāraakatvamātrapratipādane* sāmārthyāt*.

* Read *kāraka-* instead of *kāraakatva-*? *-tva-* has no equivalent in the Tibetan; cf. P_(Pe) 72a4–5 = P_(De) 60b2: *byed pa po tsam źig ston par nus pa'i phyir ro*.

⁴⁷ Confusingly enough, *ariṣṭa* seems to signify both “auspicious” and “inauspicious” omens (cf. Kale *s.v.*, meanings 2 and 3). It is clear, however, that in the present context Prajñākaragupta uses *ariṣṭa* in the sense of a bad omen that forebodes death (cf. next note: *mṛtyuprayuktam ariṣṭam*).

⁴⁸ Cf. PVABh 68.29–30 (Ms. 27a2–3): *mṛtyuprayuktam ariṣṭam iti loke vyavahāraḥ. yadi mṛtyur nābhaviṣyan* na bhaved evambhūtam ariṣṭam iti*.

* S.: *nā bhaviṣyan*.

interpretations of omens are the *Adbhuta-brāhmaṇa* of the *Sāmaveda* and the *Kauśikasūtra* of the *Atharvaveda*. Further, this topic appears in practically all literary genres: Epic, Purāṇic and narrative literature (e.g. *Kathāsaritsāgara*), plays, astrological texts (e.g., the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*)⁴⁹, in the grammatical literature (already with Pāṇini, e.g., AA 1.4.39), in philosophical works such as the *Yoga-sūtra*,⁵⁰ and so on. The *Carakasamhitā*, the influential medical compendium of the classical period, contains an entire chapter (*Indriyasthāna*) that deals with various signs of death, some of which are quite astonishing. For instance, the appearance of flower-like shapes on one's nails or one's teeth is a sure sign of death.⁵¹ Studies on omens, although not numerous, stretch over the entire field of South Asian studies, from Vedic studies, e.g., on the *Atharvavedapariśiṣṭa*,⁵² to ethnographic studies of customs and beliefs in present day Mumbai and Chennai. It is remarkable how the living notions in South Asia about omens are still very much the same as those of more than two millenia ago.⁵³

As mentioned above, Prajñākaragupta maintains that case-endings do not express temporal relations between the referents of inflected nouns in a sentence; they express various causal relationships between the referents of the nouns and the action referred to by the verb. To substantiate this point he uses the *kāraka*-theory of the Sanskrit grammarians and claims that this theory implies that a past or future thing can be a cause.⁵⁴ According to this theory, the case-endings, with the exception of the genitive ending,⁵⁵ express the fact that the referent of the inflected noun is a cause or a condition (*kāraka*) for the action referred to by the sentence verb. For instance, in the sentence “John cuts wood with an axe,” the referent of “John” is the agent, of “axe,” the instrument,

⁴⁹ In the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, eleven chapters deal with various omens (ch. 86–96).

⁵⁰ Cf. YS 3.21 (in Wood's translation 3.22). Cf. also further references to the *Mahābhārata*, the *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* and *Liṅgapurāṇa* in Wood's translation p. 251, n. 3.

⁵¹ Cf. *Indriyasthāna* 1.22: *puṣpāṇi nakhadanteṣu*. The reason for the prominent treatment of death omens in the *Carakasamhitā* is clear. The physician should avoid treating patients who display death omens because their inevitable death will reflect badly on him and his professional skills.

⁵² Kohlbrugge, *Atharvaveda-Pariśiṣṭa über Omina*, pp. 10–17, provides a short survey of omens in various works.

⁵³ Cf. Kohlbrugge, *ibid.* p. 11.

⁵⁴ The best introduction to the *kāraka* theory are probably the notes of Joshi and Roodbergen to their translation of the *Vibhakti-yāhnika*.

⁵⁵ One has to note, though, that some verbs do govern the genitive, e.g., *smṛ*, when one remembers with sadness or regret. Cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, §§ 118–123.

and of “wood,” the object; they all are causes or conditions for the action of cutting referred to by “cuts.” Now, consider a simple sentence such as “The sprout arises.”⁵⁶ The agent of this sentence is the sprout, but it certainly does not exist before the action of arising. Similarly, in the sentence “He makes a pot” the pot – as object – is supposed to be a cause or a condition for the action of making, but of course it does not exist prior to this action. Therefore, it is not the case that the cause always and necessarily precedes the effect. The opponent attempts to solve the problem by claiming that the pot indeed exists before the action, namely, in the mind of the speaker (*buddhisthatā*).

The tenet that the referents of words exist in the mind as well as the example “The sprout arises” (*aṅkuro jāyate*)⁵⁷ indicate that Prajñākaragupta has Bhartṛhari and his theory of “metonymical existence” (*upacārikī sattā*) in mind. This doctrine is developed by him in *Sambandhasamuddeśa* 39–51.⁵⁸ According to Helārāja’s commentary on v. 39, *upacāra* is to be understood here in the sense of superimposition (*adhyāropa*). When words are used, the existence of their referents is made known by the words; this existence is different from the one of the external objects and is superimposed by (and on?) the mind.⁵⁹ Thus, even referents of words denoting non-existing objects, such as “a hare’s horn,” have

⁵⁶ Cf. PVABh 68.32–33 (Ms. 27a3): *kāraakatvam evāsataḥ katham iti cet, katham aṅkuro jāyate, ghaṭaṃ karotīti kartṛkarmabhāvaḥ.*

* Ms: *karokatīti.*

⁵⁷ This example appears in Helārāja’s *Vṛtti* on VP III.1, pp. 154.13, 155.9–10, 155.15–16, etc. Cf. also Houben’s discussion in *The Sambandha-Samuddeśa*, p. 265. For Bhartṛhari the same problem arises even when the object referred to by a word already exists; cf. Houben *ibid.*, p. 267. The example of the pot was also used by Suṇeśa. According to Suṇeśa, one speaks only metonymically (*upacāra*) of the necessary antecedence of the pot to the action of making; this antecedence is thus transferred from the knowledge of the pot to the pot itself; cf. Chakravarti, *Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar*, p. 218.

⁵⁸ Cf. J. Houben, *The Sambandha-Samuddeśa*, p. 257ff. Cf. also Subrahmanya Iyer’s and Rau’s translations, pp. 98ff., and 182ff., respectively, and Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari. A Study*, pp. 209–212, 312–313.

⁵⁹ Cf. Helārāja’s commentary in VP III.1, p. 150.11–13 commenting on v. 39ab (*vya-padeśe padārthānām anyā sattaupacārikī*): **vyapadeśe** *vyapadeśanimittaṃ śabdena pratyāyane, padapratyāyyānām arthānām bāhyānām vastūnām bāhyavilakṣaṇā sattā buddhyupacāritā. bāhyārthasattāyā hi anyā buddhisamārūḍhārthākārarūpā sattā. ata evaupacārikīyam. upacāro ’dhyāropaḥ.*

their “metonymical” or superimposed existence and thus such words are capable of conveying their meaning.⁶⁰

Although the doctrine of “metonymical existence” agrees well with the Yogācāra point of view,⁶¹ Prajñākaragupta rejects it. In the sentence “He makes a pot,” a real pot is referred to, not an imaginary one in the mind of the speaker. Not even the crows would eat such an idea, he adds, referring to the popular belief that crows eat everything, even the most bitter and poisonous Kimpāka cucumbers.⁶²

The opponent further objects that causes always precede their effects because one always *sees* the cause before seeing the effect. For Prajñākaragupta, this objection is clearly mistaken. Sometimes it may happen that one first sees the effect or that the cause is not seen at all. One may see the sprout without having seen its seed when it was placed in the ground.⁶³ When seeing something, one only apprehends that it exists, not that it is a cause or effect. Therefore, there is no fault in defining the relationship between cause and

⁶⁰ Cf. VP III.1, p. 150.17: *abhāvaviṣayānām śaśaviṣāṇādīśabdānām apy ākārollekhinī*. Cf. also 150.20f.: *alātacakraśaśaviṣāṇādīnām api śabdānām nityam arthair aviyogāt sambandhanityatāsiddhiḥ*.

⁶¹ This is pointed out by Houben, *op. cit.*, p. 246. Cf. Helārāja’s *Vṛtti*, p. 150.18–19: *buddhiś ca bahir asaty apy arthe svabījavāsanāparipākavaśād ākāravagraharūpopajāyate vaikalpikī*. “And the awareness arises as apprehending the form [of the object] even when the object does not exist externally (i.e., outside the awareness) due to the maturation of the impression from its own seed, [that is, it arises as] a conceptual [awareness].”

⁶² Cf. PVABh 68.33 (Ms. 27a3–4): *buddhisthatayā kārakatve nātra tasya kākair bhakṣaṇam*. Cf. Boethlingk, *Indische Sprüche*, 754 (276):

*asadbhir asatām eva bhujyante dhanasaṃpadaḥ |
phalaṃ kiṃpākavṛṣasya dhvāṅkṣā bhakṣanti netare ||*

„Nur schlechte Menschen genießen der Schlechten Reichthümer: die Kimpāka-Gurke essen die Krähen und sonst niemand.“

Cf. also 1582 (615):

*kavayaḥ kiṃ na paśyanti kiṃ na bhakṣanti vāyasaḥ |
madyapāḥ kiṃ na jalpanti kiṃ na kurvanti yoṣitaḥ ||*

„Was sehen nicht die Dichter? Was fressen nicht die Krähen? Was schwatzen nicht die Trunkenen? Was thun nicht die Weiber?“

⁶³ Cf. PVABh 69.4 (Ms 27a4):

*yasyopalabdhiḥ prathamam tat tasya yadi kāraṇam |
na khalāntargataṃ bījaṃ hetuḥ syād anūrodaye || 439*

effect in terms of an atemporal concomitance or non-deviation. If something has another thing that does not deviate from it, precisely this fact constitutes its being the cause of that other thing.⁶⁴ This tenet could be rephrased as follows: If the effect is, was or will be present, the cause necessarily arises, has arisen or will arise because the effect does not deviate from it. What is the use of defining cause and effect as anterior and posterior respectively?

The opponent retorts that this temporal definition is certainly useful because one cannot influence the past, only the future. A motivation is possible only if a cause precedes its effect. As for the inference of future objects or lives, one can use the capable cause as a reason.⁶⁵ For example, someone who wants a good life in the future will be motivated to do something about it now. If, on the other hand, causes were in the future and their effects in the past, one would be powerless in regard to these causes, and this would lead to determinism and fatalism. Not at all, replies Prajñākaragupta, because the concomitance between cause and effect does not imply that the cause *always* exists before the effect; it could also be the other way round. Something that exists before the effect can be a cause, but inasmuch as it does not deviate from a future entity it can also be its effect.⁶⁶

Of course, the other type of inference, which is based on an essential property, could also be used to prove future lives. However, this procedure would be cumbersome and tedious: If something is in one's hand, why should one try to hold it with the foot? If something can be cut with a finger-nail, who would take the trouble to cut it with an axe?⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Cf. PVABh 69.9 (Ms. 27a5): *avyabhicāraviṣayatve tad eva kāraṇatvam*. The Tibetan translators may have read *kāraṇam* instead of *kāraṇatvam*. Cf. P_(Pe) 72b1 = P_(De) 60b5: *de ñid rgyu yin no*. However, NBhū 502.22–23: *tad eva kāraṇatvam*.

⁶⁵ PVABh 69.14 (Ms. 27a6):

*pūrvatve kāraṇasyeṣṭa upādānaṃ tadarthinām |
paratve (cā)*numānaṃ yat sāmartyāt tad bhaviṣyati || 441*

* *cā* was added by S. for metrical reasons.

⁶⁶ PVABh 69.17–18 (Ms. 27a7): *na hi prāgbhāvinaḥ kāraṇatvaṃ na vidyate. kāryatvam api tu tasya bhāvyaavyabhicārāpekṣayā bhavātīti bhāṇyate*. Thus, the causal connection is not determined by a temporal aspect. For this reason, an interpretation of “*asmīn sati*” as *parasaptamī* would be equally inadmissible for Prajñākaragupta. On *parasaptamī* cf. Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale*, s.v.

⁶⁷ Cf. PVABh 69.4:22 (Ms. 27a8):

*ko hi hastagataṃ dravyaṃ pādagāmi kariṣyati |
paraśucchedyatām ko vā nakhacchedye sahiṣyate || 442*

The above does not exhaust what Prajñākaragupta has to say about reverse causation; future objects play an important role in other religious contexts, notably in the case of yogic perception of past and future objects.⁶⁸ Prajñākaragupta's doctrine of reverse causation needs to be further examined and discussed, and I hope to return to this topic in a forthcoming short monograph. To conclude, let me return to my starting point: What is the relationship between religious tenet and philosophical argument in Prajñākaragupta's interpretation of Dependent Origination? Is it justified to say that Buddhist logic is irrelevant to religion? Can one claim that its purpose is only apologetic, or that its only use lies in the defence of religious doctrines? I think that the discussion presented here constitutes a clear case of a major modification of a religious doctrine occasioned by Dharmakīrti's logical theory. The relationship between the twelve members of Dependent Origination is consequently conceived atemporally; the causal relationship between them may have any temporal direction. However, Prajñākaragupta's logic and epistemology did not emerge unchanged from this encounter with the religious tenet of rebirth: the inference based on causality was reinterpreted by him in a revolutionary way in order to allow an inference of future lives. Thus, Prajñākaragupta's reflections on the religious doctrine of rebirth brought about a substantial development in his logic.

Moreover, Prajñākaragupta's discussion of Dependent Origination is not only a remarkable testimony of the *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of the canonical formulation, but also makes us think anew about it. If we hitherto uncritically accepted the view that the twelve members of Dependent Origination are arranged in a temporal sequence, and that they refer, as the Ābhidharmikas tell us, to three lives with two rebirths between them, the discussion in the PVABh is a useful reminder that the doctrine of *pratītyasamutpāda* cannot be easily reconciled with that of the *pañcaskandhas*, and that perhaps in the final analysis the two doctrines are incompatible with each other. After all, is there any moment in one's life in which *avidyā*, some *saṃskāras*, the *ṣaḍāyatana*, *vedanā* and *trṣṇā* are not present? The Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas even maintain that all twelve members of *pratītyasamutpāda* can be present in a single moment, for instance, at the moment of a murder.⁶⁹ However, if several members exist at the same time, how can it be said that one precedes the other?

On *hastagata* in the meaning of "in one's hand" cf. Speijer, *Sanskrit Syntax*, § 197.

⁶⁸ Cf. my "Perception of Yogis."

⁶⁹ Cf. AKBh 133.1–3: *ekasmin khalv api kṣaṇe dvādaśāṅgāni bhavanti. tadyathā lobha-vaśena prāṇinaṃ jīvitād vyaparopayet. yaḥ mohah, sāvidyā. yā cetanā, te saṃskārāḥ. ... bhaṅgo maraṇam iti.*

It is probably for this reason that the twelve members were not considered to be particular *dharmas*, but only successive states (*avasthā*) of the five *skandhas*.⁷⁰ This interpretation, however, does not seem to be faithful to the meaning of Dependent Origination as originally intended in the canonical literature. It seems rather that in the canon, Dependent Origination describes the process of rebirth with a psychological analysis of the causes and consequences of desire throughout one's life. Can the decisive factors that cause desire and those that result from it be arranged chronologically? Thanks to Prajñākaragupta's discussion we may start looking at these questions with fresh eyes.

Abbreviations and bibliography

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- AA *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In: *Pāṇini's Grammatik*. Ed. and trans. O. Boehtlingk. 2nd ed. Leipzig 1887
- AKBh *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam* of Vasubhandu. Ed. P. Pradhan. Rev. second ed. with introd. and indices etc. by Aruna Haldar. Patna 1975
- KV *Kāśikā, A Commentary on Pāṇini's Grammar by Vāmana and Jayāditya*. Ed. A. Sharma, K. Deshpande and D.G. Padhye. Heyderabad 1969, 1970
- CS *The Cāraka Saṃhitā of Agniveśa revised by Caraka and Dṛḍhabala With the Āyurveda-Dīpikā Commentary of Cakrapāṇidatta And with 'Vidyotini' Hindī Commentary By Kāśinātha Śāstrī*. Ed. Gaṅgāsahāya Pandeya. 2 vols. 2nd ed. Varanasi 1983
- NBh *Nyāyabhāṣya*. In: *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyatīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta 1936, 1944
- NBhū *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña. Ed. Yogīndrānanda. Varanasi 1968
- NV *Nyāyavārttika*. Cf. NBh
- PVABh *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārttikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta*. Ed. Rahula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953
- PVABh (Ms.) *Sanskrit manuscripts of Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*. Ed. Sh. Watanabe. Patna 1998

⁷⁰ Cf. AKBh 131.20f.

PVṬ	<i>Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā</i> of Śākyabuddhi. Derge 4220
PVP	<i>Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā</i> of Devendrabuddhi. Derge 4217
<i>Bṛhatsaṃhitā</i>	<i>Bṛhatsaṃhitā</i> of Varāhamihira. Ed. Kṛṣṇacandra Dvivedī. Varanasi 1996
MBh	<i>Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya</i> of Patañjali. Ed. F. Kielhorn. 3 vols. Bombay 1980–1985
MSA	<i>Mahāyāna-Sūtralaṃkāra, exposé de la doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra</i> . Edité et traduit d'après un manuscrit rapporté du Népal, par Sylvain Lévi. Paris 1907–1911
YS	<i>Patanjali's Yoga Sūtras. With the commentary of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati Miśra</i> . Ed. Rāma Prasāda. 2 nd ed. Delhi 1978.
VP III.1	<i>Vākyapadīya</i> of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja. Kaṇḍa III, part 1. Ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Poona 1963
S.	Sāṅkṛtyāyana's readings in PVABh
SBhT	<i>Svāyambhūvatantra</i> in Filliozat 1991

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