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Xuanzang's Silence and Dharmakīrti's Dates*

Xuanzang's work was decisive in the spread of Buddhism and specifically Buddhist logic from South to East Asia. In order to gain a better understanding and appreciation of his work, it is relevant to first look at the state of Indian philosophy as he encountered it during the period in which he was residing and traveling in South Asia. After that we can raise some crucial questions, such as: what could he have known, how much of it is reflected in his writings, what was he interested in, what was negligible to him, and why?

From this perspective, his silence on Dharmakīrti and consequently Dharmakīrti's dates are of the utmost importance. Not least because in the light of some recent publications by Helmut Krasser, we are compelled to ask: Was Xuanzang a brilliant master of the science of reasoning (*hetuvidyā*), as we have tended to assume, or was he rather out of date, and perhaps out of his depth, with regard to the most important developments in this field, which had already happened some hundred years before his time?¹

Dharmakīrti was dated to the seventh century even before the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition became an object of modern scholarly study. Already Wassili Wassiljew in *Der Buddhismus, seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur* (St. Petersburg 1860, Russian original 1857) dated him to the seventh century.² The current and widely accepted dating (ca. 635-650) was, however, established by Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in his posthumous publication *A History of Indian Logic* (1921: 303). The commonly found date of 600-660 goes back to Erich Frauwallner's "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", and is solely due to

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¹ In this connection, I wish to express my sorrow at the untimely death of our colleague Helmut Krasser. It saddens me that he will not be able to respond to the various points I shall raise below, and perhaps show me that I have understood some of his arguments poorly. I should add, however, that several years ago I already communicated to him my doubts concerning his innovative hypothesis about Dharmakīrti's dates, though not, of course, in the same detail as I shall give below.

² Wassiljew 1860: 58, n. 1, starting on p. 50 (= p. 54 of the Russian original): "Da Dharmakīrti für einen Zeitgenossen des tibetischen Königs Srongtsan Gambo gilt, so lässt sich daraus schliessen, dass dieses [i.e., das Verfinstern der Sonne des Buddhismus, E.F.] im siebenten Jahrhundert nach Chr. vorgeht." Note, however, that the time of Srong btsan sgam po is now a point of dispute among historians of Tibet. Some assign him to the seventh century, others to the sixth.

Frauwallner's convention of assigning a lifetime of sixty years to philosophers whose actual lifespan is unknown.³ In fact, Frauwallner simply repeats Vidyabhusana's dating without acknowledgment.⁴ Both Vidyabhusana and Frauwallner base their dating on the fact that Xuanzang, who left India in 644, does not mention Dharmakīrti, although I Ching, who traveled around India during the period of 671-695, mentions Dharmakīrti as a great master.

This dating of Dharmakīrti has been challenged several times, notably by Christian Lindtner (1980) and Toshihiko Kimura (1999) and most recently by Krasser (2012a). All three have argued, though on different grounds, that Dharmakīrti was known to Bhāviveka and therefore his dates must be moved back to the sixth century. However, while Lindtner's and Kimura's dates have met with wide-spread skepticism and were refuted by Ernst Steinkellner (1991) and Toru Funayama (2000) respectively, the new dating by Krasser (ca. 550) has been accepted by leading scholars such as Steinkellner (2013) and Vincent Eltschinger (2013), the former in a somewhat qualified and cautious manner, the latter without any reservations.⁵ However, as I will try to show, Krasser's dating raises considerable problems that have yet to be properly addressed, and might be seen on the whole as creating more problems than it solves.

From the outset, a number of shortcomings should be noted in Krasser's methodological procedure, in particular a lack of attention to details, a certain negligence regarding context, an improper use of Occam's razor, the overstretching of his conclusions, a disregard of the relevant literature, and occasional distortion of both primary and secondary literature.

Krasser begins by pointing out similar statements in Bhāviveka's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK) and *Tarkajvālā* (TJ) commentary (which, unlike most scholars, he considers to be a genuine work by Bhāviveka), and in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, notably on the subject of *apoha* (as pointed out earlier by Tom Tillemans in 2011), on the unreliability of the Veda, on Buddhist *āgama*, on omniscience and, what might be called his trump card, on *sattvānumāna*. In one section he also compares the *Madhyamakārthasaṅgraha*, whose attribution to Bhāviveka is generally contested, to the

³ Frauwallner 1961: 137 (= 1982: 859).

⁴ In his "methodological observations" (Frauwallner 1961: 125 = 1982: 847), he says, somewhat unkindly: "The opinion of experienced scholars may be of value even when they are not based on firm evidence. But to quote mere unfounded suppositions as authority only leads us astray. Data from works such as Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana's *History of Indian Logic*, Calcutta 1921, which abound in errors and inaccuracies, must not be utilized without a thorough examination."

⁵ Balcerowicz (2016) already takes Krasser's dating for granted and uses it for his dating of Jaina philosophers.

Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya and claims that it too should be considered as a genuine work by Bhāviveka.

Krasser himself must have been aware that the similarities he adduces between Bhāviveka's and Dharmakīrti's ideas are much too vague and general and do not permit any conclusion as to whether there was a relationship of dependency between them, whether they both relied on a common source, or whether these ideas were simply "in the air" (see p. 537 and 558).

While making the individual comparisons, Krasser still remains fairly cautious. Thus, on the topic of *apoha* (§1.1) he quotes (2012a: 537) and concurs with Tillemans (2011: 458) that

[a] more moderate and defensible conclusion would be that Dharmakīrti simply wasn't particularly original in coming up with his *apoha* theory – the basic ideas were already 'in the air'.

When comparing Bhāviveka's and Dharmakīrti's statements on the Veda (§1.2), he follows Shinjō Kawasaki, who points out that Vasubandhu's Abhidharma-kośa may have well been the source for both of them (2012a: 540-541). When comparing Bhāviveka's and Dharmakīrti's positions on the Buddhist *āgama* (§1.3), he concludes (2012a: 550):

Again we see here a correspondence between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti, but again we have no clue for solving the problem of their relationship, as neither refers to the other.

In his discussion of the topic of *cintāmayī prajñā* (§1.4) he concludes (2012a: 554):

Again, nothing in these passages clearly indicates whether Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti knew each other, or who was influenced by whom.⁶

Likewise, when referring to the alleged similarity of MHK 5.113 (with the Tarkajvālā thereon) with Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PVSV) 108,2-6, Krasser concludes (p. 545) by saying: "This passage, too, does not allow one to decide whether Bhāviveka was inspired by Dharmakīrti or the other way round." Regrettably he fails to consider that they may have worked independently of one another or both drew on a common source; in that case, Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya would suggest itself.

However, when summarizing his results, he dismisses the possibility that Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti were relying on common sources, or that "the ideas were in the air", and concludes (2012a: 558):

⁶ Krasser's discussion contains two further sections. §1.5 deals with the Madhyamakārthasaṅgraha, whose attribution to Bhāviveka is generally rejected (Krasser has no real argument against this common opinion, so I shall not discuss this section here), and §1.6 discusses the *sattvānumāna*, to which I shall return below.

If both of them developed their theories independently, as “the basic ideas were already ‘in the air’,” as cautiously proposed by Tillemans, then the air must have been quite thick. But the material presented so far seems rather to indicate that there must have been a relationship between these two scholars.

And once again, on p. 578-579, the same four points mentioned above (§1.1-4) that disallowed us from concluding a direct relationship between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti are individually enumerated as “the points ... that suggest some sort of relationship” (2012a: 578) between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti. It is clear from the context that with “some sort of relationship”, Krasser means a relationship of direct dependence without determination of who depends on whom. What, one wonders, must have happened en route from the individual to the general conclusions for the possibility of a common source or of “ideas in the air” to have simply disappeared like this?

One of the more questionable points in Krasser’s method of comparison is his disregard of context. He notes for instance that Dharmakīrti’s and Bhāviveka’s positions on *āgama* are “quite different” (2012a: 542), but argues (p. 543f.) that Dharmakīrti’s opinion appears as a *pūrvapakṣa* in MHK 9.20. However, as Krasser well knows, chapter 9 of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* is the chapter on *Mīmāṃsā*. What would Dharmakīrti be doing in a chapter on *Mīmāṃsā*? And why would his opinion appear as a *Mīmāṃsā pūrvapakṣa* (if indeed the verse represents a *pūrvapakṣa*)?⁷ Krasser finds this fact interesting “enough” (p. 543), and does not consider that the opinion expressed there may actually be a *Mīmāṃsā* opinion. Instead he apodictically maintains (ibid.) that “[i]t [viz. the *pūrvapakṣa*] is certainly not expressing the view of a *Mīmāṃsaka*.” Considering how little we know about the numerous *Mīmāṃsā* commentaries prior to Kumāriḥ, his confidence is impressive.⁸ Not until the general conclusion does Krasser suggest a somewhat contrived and confusing explanation (2012a: 577):

This [Bhāviveka’s use of Dharmakīrti’s theories]⁹ may also explain why Bhāviveka placed the *pūrvapakṣa*, according to which *āgama* must withstand a

⁷ At least according to Shinjō Kawasaki (1987), the *uttarapakṣa* part of chapter 9 begins with verse 18. The fact that the adjective *mīmāṃsya* appears in verse 20 does not imply that the verse represents a *Mīmāṃsā* position.

⁸ Note that in the second part of his paper (2012a: 567-568), Krasser refers to a *Mīmāṃsaka* who lived before Dharmakīrti and was referred to by him, who abandoned the definition of the Veda as *apauruṣeya*; would one not also say in such a case that this *pūrvapakṣa* by no means expresses the view of a *Mīmāṃsaka*? On the other hand, when it is convenient for him Krasser is less than hesitant to use context as an argument. Thus, criticizing Hoornaert (2000: 90-91, n. 1), who suggested that an opponent referred to by *paraḥ* (in MHK 5.9, more on this below) might be a non-Buddhist or a Śrāvaka, Krasser brushes this aside saying (p. 545): “Neither interpretation makes much sense when refuting the Yogācāra tenets.”

⁹ The previous sentence reads: “Bhāviveka may have been using the new theories of his contemporary Dharmakīrti – which the latter had developed in reaction to the criticism of Kumāri-

critical analysis (§1.3.1), in the Mīmāṃsā and not in the Yogācāra chapter: it does not make a good impression to rely on a contemporary Yogācāra scholar whose understanding of *tattva* is completely wrong.

This is rather puzzling, because if Dharmakīrti's position is presented as a *pūrvapakṣa*, no matter in which chapter, in what way can it be said that Bhāviveka relies on it? And independent of that, what about the "good impression" in all those other cases in which, according to Krasser, Bhāviveka borrowed directly from Dharmakīrti?

It may also be noted that Krasser seriously misrepresents Dharmakīrti's opinion on *āgama* when he states (p. 547) that "*āgama* must be examined in *its entirety*" (emphasis in the original).¹⁰ It has long been observed by Tillemans and myself that according to Dharmakīrti the teachings of the Buddha cannot be examined in their entirety, at least not directly; for instance, the workings of karma in previous lives and certain rules in the Vinaya are beyond rational examination. These parts of the Buddha's teaching are considered by Dharmakīrti to be secondary and are only accepted because the Buddha is established as a reliable person (*pramāṇa*).¹¹ This misrepresentation is amply clear from PVSV 109,3-4, which Krasser quotes in J.D. Dunne's translation (2012a: 547, n. 29, emphasis added by H.K.):

The scripture's purity [i.e., its lack of contradiction] in regard to *all* those objects which can be determined in the above manner constitutes its trustworthiness.

Oddly, though, Krasser disregards Dharmakīrti's clear qualification: all those objects that can be determined (*śakyaparicchedāśeṣaviṣaya*). Not everything can be determined in the above manner.

Krasser also misrepresents Dharmakīrti (PV 1.217) when he says (p. 549) that he (Dharmakīrti) reduces the domain of the Buddha's omniscience to the four noble truths. What Dharmakīrti says in his famous statement in PV 2.31cd is that knowledge of the number of worms¹² is of no use to us. He does not deny that the Buddha's omniscience in fact also extends to the number of insects and worms in the world, and indeed later Buddhist logicians explicitly attributed to the Buddha an omniscience that covers everything (cf. *sarvasarvajña*), the number of insects and worms included. But even if Krasser were right on this

la – in order to refute the famous Yogācāra master Dignāga and to establish the truth and fame of the Mādhyamikas."

¹⁰ Note also that Bhāviveka does not mention the Buddhist *āgama*, or the Buddha's teaching, being examined in its entirety, but rather the Madhyamakāśāstra (*dbu ma'i bstan bcos*), which, as noted by Krasser in n. 31, is attributed to the *ācārya*, which is to say, to Nāgārjuna.

¹¹ See Tillemans 1993 and Franco 1999.

¹² On *kīṭa* see Wezler 2007: 647-649. In a still unpublished paper, Wezler came to the conclusion that the word originally refers to larvae, i.e., maggots and caterpillars.

point, I still do not see that Bhāviveka reduced the Buddha's knowledge to the domain of the four noble truths (p. 548-549). At least none of the Tarkajvālā quotations in his pages testifies to that. On the contrary, TJ 9.164, with which Krasser (p. 548 with n. 36) aims to substantiate his opinion, actually states that the Buddha also taught the way to heaven (*mtho ris*, **svarga*), which could hardly be said to be part of the four noble truths. That the Buddha's knowledge includes the four noble truths (see n. 37) is hardly a remarkable statement. However, I think that Krasser would be hard-pressed to show that the Buddha, according to Bhāviveka, knows nothing else.

However, Krasser would probably admit that none of the aforementioned materials proves that Dharmakīrti preceded Bhāviveka; at most, he seems to claim that there must be a direct relationship of dependency between them. His trump card, as it were, is the so-called *sattvānumāna*. This he considers to be the single most decisive case which makes it clear that Bhāviveka is referring to Dharmakīrti. On p. 556, he refers to MHK 9.45ab: *sattvād anityaḥ śabda 'yaṃ kriyāvat kiṃ na grhyate* |. On the basis of this statement alone,¹³ Krasser concludes (2012a: 556-558):¹⁴

Now, to the best of my knowledge, this type of inference, the so-called *sattvānumāna*, did not exist before Dharmakīrti but was developed by Dharmakīrti himself in several stages, although components of the argument are already present in PV 1.269-283ab (PVSV 141,17-150,5). One of its formulations runs like this:

yat sat tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, saṃś ca śabda iti [...] HB 5*,18ff.

Whatever exists is momentary, like a pot, etc., and sound exists [...]

An inference like this cannot be formulated in a serious way just out of thin air; it must have been explained somewhere. Since it is not explained by Bhāviveka himself, and since modern experts agree that this theory is Dharmakīrti's, a fact that is also supported by Arcaṭa, a commentator on Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu*, I can see no other possibility than to assume that this formulation of the *sattvānumāna* in the MHK presupposes knowledge of Dharmakīrti, unless we postulate some unknown factors or assume that Bhāviveka applies a logical reason that was already shown by Uddyotakara to be faulty.¹⁵

¹³ Krasser does not consider the short commentary in the Tarkajvālā to be genuine, and in any case the commentary does not add anything significant to the above.

¹⁴ Since he considers this to be the most crucial point, I quote his argument at some length, without the footnotes, however, which, while containing valuable references, are immaterial to the argument.

¹⁵ Oddly enough, Krasser does not believe that Uddyotakara was criticizing a Buddhist *sattvānumāna* in his *Nyāyavārttika* (2012a: 557-558, n. 57): "As Uddyotakara, when explaining the different kinds of pseudo-reasons, also presents proofs in which the permanence of the word is inferred from its non-existence (*sādhyatajjātīyavipakṣāvṛttih*, *nityaḥ śabda 'sattvāt* NV 159,15 on

In his eagerness to prove Bhāviveka's knowledge of Dharmakīrti, Krasser overlooks one or two things. First, Bhāviveka presents the inference in its traditional form, not in the Dharmakīrtian form of *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* such as in the quote Krasser adduces from the Hetubindu. But more importantly, Krasser ignores that the two inferences have different *sādhya*s: while Bhāviveka proves impermanence (*anityatā*), Dharmakīrti proves momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*). One can also mention that the subjects and contexts are not quite the same. Bhāviveka argues against the Mīmāṃsā that the Veda (= *śabda*) is impermanent,¹⁶ while Dharmakīrti attempts to prove the Buddhist tenet that everything is momentary; in the inference in the Hetubindu, *śabda* functions as *pars pro toto* for any object or for everything.

Thus, when considered closely, Krasser's entire evidence for the alleged relationship between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti disappears into thin air. However, in all fairness to Krasser we should also consider some evidence that escaped his notice. I think we can show a relationship between Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and Pramāṇavārttika that goes far beyond mere "ideas in the air." Let me draw attention to the relationship between MHK 5.9 and PV 2.30:

*nāgamāntarasamdigdhaviparyastamatih paraḥ /
tasmāt tatpratipattyarthaṃ tanmṛgyo yuktimannayaḥ //* (MHK 5.9)

"The other one, whose mind is in doubt and confused by other scriptures, does not [put the teachings of a reliable person into practice, E.F.]. Therefore the path of reasoning (*yuktimannaya*) should be followed by him in order to put these into practice."¹⁷

*jñānavān mṛgyate kaścit taduktapratipattaye /
ajñopadeśakaraṇe vipralambhanaśankhibhiḥ //* (PV 2.30)

Those who suspect deceit in the teaching of an ignorant person seek some knowledgeable person in order to put into practice what is taught by him.¹⁸

NSū 1.2.4; *sādhyaatajjāṭīyāvṛttir avidyamānavipakṣaḥ, anityaḥ śabdo 'sattvāt* NV 160,1 on NSū 1.2.4; *sādhyaāvṛttir avidyamānasajātir vipakṣāvṛttih, nityaḥ śabdo 'sattvāt* NV 160,4 on NSū 1.2.4) the application of the *sattvānumāna* does not imply that he is referring to a *sattvānumāna* that has been applied by a Buddhist in order to prove the impermanence of words, or to the one developed by Dharmakīrti. Also his use of the optative (*sādhayet*) [in NV 444,15: *sattvād anityam iti sādha-yet*, E.F.] might indicate a more hypothetical assumption. In any case, this certainly can be excluded as Bhāviveka's source."

¹⁶ This is very clear from the context, the criticism of the Mīmāṃsā. MHK 9.45ab quoted above (cf. p. 122) comes after a statement that the eternity of the Veda is also untenable because the reason given for it in the Mīmāṃsā inference is inconclusive (MHK 9.44cd): *vyabhicāritayā hetoḥ śabdanityatvam apy asat //*.

¹⁷ Krasser 2012a: 546.

¹⁸ This verse, together with Prajñākaragupta's commentary, has also been translated in Moriyama 2014: 251.

The strong similarity between the two verses cannot be an accident; every element of the one has a correspondence in the other, although Krasser's translation obfuscates this slightly. The correspondence between *tatpratipattiyartham* and *taduktapratipattaye* is more than obvious. Equally obvious is the correspondence between *-mr̥gyo* and *mr̥gyate*. Furthermore, *āgamāntarasamdigdhaviparyastamatih* is very close to *ajñopadeśakaraṇe vipralambhanaśaṅkhibhiḥ: āgamāntara-* is an equivalent to *ajñopadeśa-*, and a person referred to as *samdigdhaviparyastamatih* is not different from persons referred to with *vipralambhanaśaṅkhibhiḥ*.¹⁹ Consequently, we can also understand the word *yuktimannayah* as a *bahuvrīhi* compound ("someone whose method is endowed with reasoning") and thus equivalent to *jñānavān*, and not as a *karmadhāraya* compound as assumed by Krasser. This is also supported by the *Tarkajvālā*.²⁰

The second part of MHK 5.9 may thus be translated:

Therefore, a [person] who proceeds rationally should be sought out by that [other person] in order to put that (i.e., his teaching) into practice.

Even though the similarity between the two verses (MHK 5.9 and PV 2.30) cannot be accidental and is stronger than any of the parallels put forth by Krasser, not even in this instance can one ascertain a direct relationship of dependence, and this is even less so in the cases adduced by Krasser. The two authors may very well be referring to a third common source.

So far we have seen that none of Krasser's arguments for a relationship of dependency between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti holds water. However, in the second part of his paper, Krasser attempts to establish a direct relationship between Bhāviveka and Kumāriḷa. The relevance of this section for Dharmakīrti's dates is clear. Since Kumāriḷa is considered to be an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti,²¹ if one could establish that Bhāviveka lived after Kumāriḷa, it

¹⁹ Note that the commentary on *samdigdhaviparyastamatih* in MHK 5.9 paraphrases the word in the plural, to Krasser's puzzlement.

²⁰ Quoted but misunderstood by Krasser (2012a: 546): *smra ba po rigs pa dan ldan pa'i tshul* ... A similar misunderstanding occurs in Eckel 2008: 227.

²¹ Krasser has dedicated a separate study to the relationship between Kumāriḷa and Dharmakīrti, where he argues that Dharmakīrti knew the Ślokavārttika (Krasser 1999). The remarkable thing about Krasser's methodology there is that he uses both similarities and dissimilarities to support his hypothesis (which reiterates Frauwallner's opinion). The similarities between the two discussed passages in the Ślokavārttika and Pramāṇavārttika are explained by the assumption that Dharmakīrti refers to Kumāriḷa, and the dissimilarities by the assumption that Dharmakīrti assumed that his readers already knew Kumāriḷa's text and he thus did not need to repeat it (1999: 222): "The fact that Dharmakīrti did not include the *hetu*'s being contradictory (*viruddha*) or the statement that the atoms, being insentient, could not obey God's will, may be explained in such a way that he considered it to be enough to refer to that passage in the Ślokavārttika by mentioning some of the faults shown there, and that he felt no need to repeat all of them." But if using

would be reasonable to assume that he also lived later than Dharmakīrti and that conversely, if Bhāviveka lived after Dharmakīrti, he must have known Kumāriḷa, the most important Mīmāṃsā representative of the time.

It would be tedious to undertake a detailed examination of the passages reported by Krasser. On the whole, it is beyond dispute that similar ideas appear in Bhāviveka and Kumāriḷa's writings, as already reported by Christian Lindtner, among others, in the 1980s. At the beginning of the section, Krasser does not claim that the passages indicate a direct relationship and allows the possibility that both drew on an unknown common source (e.g., 2012a: 559 and 565). But just as in the case of Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti, as soon as the conclusions are summarised they mutate and become much bolder. Thus, on p. 568 Krasser abandons his previous caution and argues for a direct relationship between the two:

As in the case of Dharmakīrti, the material presented in §2.1-5 suggests that there must have been some kind of relation between Kumāriḷa and Bhāviveka, unless we assume an otherwise unknown forerunner of Kumāriḷa who left no traces in the writings of later Mīmāṃsakas at all.²²

Then, while he discusses the authenticity of the Tarkajvālā and its relationship to the Prajñāpradīpa, he seems to throw all caution to the winds and the following speculation is offered as a conclusion (2012a: 574):

If we now relate the PP and the MHK/TJ with regard to the topic *sarvajñatva*, as discussed above, it seems to have not been a serious issue when the PP was composed, since it had to be added later in the form of a digression. After the original composition of the PP, the topic is addressed in the MHK/TJ but is not well structured and it leaves the *pūrvapakṣa* formulated in MHK 9.16ab (*apramāṇam vaco buddhaṃ kṛtakatvāt tadanyavat /*) unanswered. Later, when the PP was taught, the much better structured digression was added. This gives the impression that the issue of omniscience entered the market sometime between the composition of the PP and the MHK/TJ.

similar arguments and omitting similar arguments both speak for a relationship of dependence, one wonders what would speak against it. This argument sounds a bit like "tails I win, heads you lose." It seems more probable that Dharmakīrti and Kumāriḷa are referring independently to the same or similar Nyāya sources. For a recent study of Dharmakīrti's sources see Moriyama 2014. On the relationship between Dharmakīrti and Kumāriḷa see also the Addendum at the end of this paper.

²² I have no objections to assuming such a forerunner, or even several forerunners. However, it is not true that no traces are left. We see such traces in Buddhist literature, as for instance in the Spitzer Manuscript, in the Upadeśa attributed to Nāgārjuna (see below), and not least in Bhāviveka's own work. The circularity in Krasser's reasoning is apparent. If Bhāviveka came later than Kumāriḷa, it would be reasonable to assume that he refers to the latter. But this assumption is already presupposed when Krasser claims that no traces are left by previous Mīmāṃsaka, in order to then argue that Bhāviveka must postdate Kumāriḷa.

A remarkable precision. What is more, it is this very topic of omniscience that Krasser considers to be the key to determining the relationship between Bhāviveka, on the one hand, and Kumāriḷa and Dharmakīrti on the other. In his general conclusions on p. 580 he writes:

The situation we are facing now is that for Śabarasvāmin, the author of a Bhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra, who is commonly placed in the first half of the 6th century and thus assumed to be a contemporary of Bhāviveka (490/500-570), omniscience is not very important. The two authors who vehemently discuss this topic, Kumāriḷa, who commented on Śabara's Bhāṣya, and Dharmakīrti, are placed in the first half of the 7th century, thus leaving Bhāviveka without any known opponent in this regard. Moreover, this topic, so hotly disputed by Bhāviveka, is then completely ignored until the time of Kumāriḷa and Dharmakīrti. A quite unlikely scenario.

I have to admit that I have no idea what the supposedly common opinion about the contemporaneity of Śabara and Bhāviveka rests on. As far as I know, Śabara displays no knowledge of Dignāga and is usually considered to precede him. However, we need not enter into this question any further because the foundations of this entire edifice crumble as soon as we remember that the topic of omniscience already "entered the market" in the second or third century, as testified to by the Spitzer Manuscript,²³ which is to say, several centuries before Bhāviveka's time. And we already find arguments there that read like those of Bhāviveka's and Dharmakīrti's Mīmāṃsaka opponents.

To conclude this section, another piece of evidence should be mentioned that escaped Krasser's notice. Akira Saito, who investigated the self-appellation of the Madhyamaka authors, has pointed out (2007: 155) that Bhāviveka was the first among them to call himself a *Mādhyamika (dBU ma pa) or *Mādhyamikavādin (dBU mar smra ba). On the strength of this, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu has pointed out recently²⁴ that in all probability Kumāriḷa must be dated after Bhāviveka because he already knew the distinction between Yogācāras and Mādhyamikas (whom he refers to as *mādhyamikavādinah* in the Ślokavārttika [ŚV] Nirāḷambanavāda 14).

²³ Cf. Franco 2004a: I/315, n7b1: *atra brūmaḥ anenaiva kāraṇena sarvvajña iti jñeyah*, and 319, n18a3: *sarvvajño bhagavān gītanṛttavadyajñānāt sarāgo bhavati* "The omniscient Buddha becomes passionate (i.e., is not free from desires) because he knows songs, dances and music." Similar arguments are still employed by Mīmāṃsakas in Bhāviveka's and Kumāriḷa's time. See also 111b3 (p. 108), where omniscience is perhaps attributed to Śāriputra. The term *sarvvajña* also appears in the following fragments: 157a1 (p. 152), n43a1 (p. 326), 303aa (p. 191) and perhaps in 105a2 (p. 105) and 125b2 (p. 120). Cf. also Franco 2004b and 2012. Furthermore, in n. 60 on p. 559 Krasser quotes an argument against omniscience in the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (pointed out by Kiyotaka Yoshimizu). I am not sure to which period Krasser would date this work, but it certainly predates Bhāviveka because it was translated into Chinese in 404-405.

²⁴ Yoshimizu 2015a: 43-44, n. 1.

None of the above demonstrates that Krasser's hypothesis is absolutely false, merely that it lacks any real evidence. So let us consider the possibility that Krasser is right. What would be the consequences? It is clear that if we move Dharmakīrti's dates to the middle of the sixth century, numerous other dates would have to be changed as well, because we have to assume that there were at least two generations between Dharmakīrti and Dignāga,²⁵ who is now commonly considered to have lived ca. 480-540, and thus would have died only 10 years before Dharmakīrti's assumed floruit. Further, it would be impossible to assume an earlier date for Dignāga to solve this problem, if Vasubandhu the Kośakāra indeed lived ca. 400-480, as Frauwallner and others assumed. However, the theory of two Vasubandhus has all but collapsed, and even the theory's die-hard supporters (such as Lambert Schmithausen) assign the "later" Vasubandhu to the fourth century, or at the very latest to the beginning of the fifth.²⁶ So in theory at least, we can shift "everybody" backwards by about sixty to eighty years. As far as I can see, there is not a single philosopher from that period, not even among the Jinas, whose dates are so firmly established that they cannot be moved by some sixty years. As for Sthiramati's dates, there is nothing to indicate that the Sthiramati mentioned in the famous inscription of the kings of Valabhī (dated by Schopen [1997: 262] to 575 CE) is the same Sthiramati as the Yogācāra commentator.²⁷

The trouble is that if we make this assumption, we would have an empty century on our hands. In other words, assuming Dharmakīrti's floruit was in 550 (and that of Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi between 550 and 600), there would be no single Buddhist philosopher we know of who lived between 600 and 700. This would be a rather strange state of affairs in view of the intense philosophical activity which would be documented for the sixth and the eighth century.

Further, Krasser tries to explain away Xuanzang's silence about Dharmakīrti (2012a: 583ff.). He points out that according to Shoryu Katsura,²⁸ "Xuanzang

²⁵ It seems improbable that Uddyotakara, Praśastapāda, Prabhākara, Kumārila, Śaṅkarasvāmin, Īśvarasena, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (possibly Rājāna Gopālaka, see Wezler – Motegi 1998: XXVII), some Cārvākas (such as the creator of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*), several Jinas (such as Jinabhadraṅgaṇi) and so on can be squeezed into a single generation between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

²⁶ See Schmithausen 1992.

²⁷ A very clear reference to Dharmakīrti's classification of reasons as *kārya-*, *svabhāva-* and *anupalabdhihetu* was discovered by Yasuhiro Ueno in Sthiramati's commentary on the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra 18.82a (Derge 4034, Mi 95a7-b2, reported by Krasser in p. 581, n. 99). If this is not a unique case that could be explained as a later interpolation, I would certainly assume that this Sthiramati knew Dharmakīrti.

²⁸ See p. 587, n. 107.

may have known Dharmakīrti's logic" (p. 587). Katsura points out certain similarities between Dharmakīrti and Xuanzang in the usage of the particle *eva* in the formulation of the first condition of a valid reason. From this he concludes that one may assume that Xuanzang was familiar with Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the *trairūpya* or that "trairūpya was interpreted by other scholars²⁹ in that way when Xuanzang studied Buddhist logic in India."³⁰ However, why would Xuanzang follow Dharmakīrti on a rather obscure point concerning the particle *eva*, but remain totally silent about Dharmakīrti's pivotal teachings?

Moreover, Xuanzang is not the only scholar in the relevant period to remain silent about Dharmakīrti. Perhaps even more significant is Candrakīrti's silence about him. If Bhāviveka knew Dharmakīrti, why does Candrakīrti, who lived a generation or so later, pass over him in silence? In view of Candrakīrti's intense critique of Dignāga's notion of *svalakṣaṇa*,³¹ it is hard to imagine that if Candrakīrti had known Dharmakīrti, he would not have taken his interpretation of *svalakṣaṇa* into consideration. Further, in a recent study Chizuko Yoshimizu has shown that Candrakīrti undertook a close study of Dignāga's and Bhāviveka's theories of *parārthānumāna*.³² It is virtually inconceivable that he would not even have alluded to Dharmakīrti's doctrine of the same had he known it.

One must also consider the general silence about Dharmakīrti outside the Buddhist tradition. Here the Jaina tradition is especially valuable, for it is the only one that can provide more or less accurate dates that are independent of Dignāga or Dharmakīrti. For instance, Jinabhadra(gaṇi), the author of the *Vīśeṣāvaśyākabhāṣya*, knew Dignāga, but evinced no knowledge of Dharmakīrti.³³ Jinabhadra is generally believed to have lived at the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries; the *Vīśeṣāvaśyākabhāṣya* was composed in 609 according to Muni Jinavijayaji, which date has been seconded by Mahendra Kumar Jain.³⁴ Jinavijaya's dating is based on the *praśasti* of the *Vīśeṣāvaśyākabhāṣya* as well as on lists of Śvetāmbara pontiffs. Dalsukh Malvania maintains that the *praśasti* refers to the copying of the manuscript, but even so it is clear that Jinabhadra did not live before the last quarter of the sixth century. Whatever the case may be, the

²⁹ Katsura alludes to the possibility that Xuanzang's use of *eva* in the formulation of the first condition goes back to Uddyotakara (1985: 164).

³⁰ Katsura 1985: 164.

³¹ See Arnold 2005: 152ff.

³² See Yoshimizu 2012.

³³ The fact that he divides *pratyakṣa* into *mukhya* and *sāṃvya vahārika* would hardly be enough for the assumption that he knew Dharmakīrti; see Mahendra Kumar's note in his introduction to the SVT, p. 36 with n. 3.

³⁴ Cf. the introduction to the SVT, p. 35-36. I thank Anne Clavel for this reference.

first Jaina philosopher to refer to Dharmakīrti is Akalaṅka (ca. 720-780).³⁵ Here, too, we may wonder why no Jaina philosopher of the seventh century, or even of the second half of the sixth century, would have referred to Dharmakīrti if the latter had lived ca. 550.

Consequently we may conclude that Xuanzang's silence is also due to the fact that Dharmakīrti was not generally known before the second half of the seventh century. Even so, Krasser's explanation of Xuanzang's silence might still be valid. He begins (2012a: 585) by quoting Frauwallner's statement that "Dharmakīrti, according to his own statement, failed to achieve recognition for many years."³⁶ One would have to understand that according to Krasser the introductory verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika* to which Frauwallner and he himself refer³⁷ here describes a state of affairs that actually continued for at least a century after Dharmakīrti's death. However, Frauwallner also points out that the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* lacks bitter introductory verses comparable to that of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and assumes, correctly I would say, that the *Nyāyabindu* was composed for a circle of students who gathered around Dharmakīrti. This clearly implies that at a later stage of his career Dharmakīrti enjoyed success and recognition, at least of a moderate order. Thus, it cannot be extrapolated from the verse that he remained completely unknown or unsuccessful for all his life, or even for more than a century after his demise.

Even more problematic is a further aspect of Krasser's interpretation of Dharmakīrti's complaint in the introductory verse of the *Pramāṇavārttika* under discussion. While Dharmakīrti bemoans the hostility he experiences from people (*jana*) who generally lack wisdom are addicted to vulgarity and afflicted with jealousy, Krasser turns these unspecified people into "people, for instance, the officials at Nālandā" (p. 585). On the next page he speaks of "the leaders of a big religious institution like Nālandā" (p. 586), and in an earlier version of his paper about "the religious authorities."³⁸ Needless to say, we know nothing about such leaders or authorities, or about an institutional suppression or censorship of Dharmakīrti's works. It rather seems that Krasser made these up as he went along.

On top of that, Krasser is also ready to tell us what exactly it was that "could have been so terrible in Dharmakīrti's texts" (p. 585) that the officials suppressed or censored his work (2012a: 585-586):

³⁵ Or perhaps Siddhasena Mahāmati, who is dated by Balcerowicz to 710/720-770/780.

³⁶ See Frauwallner 1961: 138 (= 1982: 860).

³⁷ PVSV 1,4-7.

³⁸ See Krasser's reference in n. * on p. 535.

The only point that could have incurred such displeasure, as far as I can see, might be his claim that *āgama*, including the words of the Buddha, is not a *pramāṇa* on a *sāṃvyaṅgī* level. This is something Dharmakīrti stresses several times.³⁹

And he adds (p. 586):

Such statements were certainly not seen favourably by the leaders of a big religious institution like Nālandā, especially since there was, as depicted above, a lot of competition in the area of religion. How were they to propagate Buddhism if the Buddha is not even a *pramāṇa*, if there is no certainty whether what he has said about supersensible matters is true?

Actually, Dharmakīrti never says that *āgama*, including the words of the Buddha, is not a *pramāṇa* on a *sāṃvyaṅgī* level. This is only Krasser's dubious if not far-fetched assumption. And even if one considers supersensible matters to be part of *vyavahāra*, and even if Krasser's interpretation of Dharmakīrti were exact, which it is not, one would still wonder whether saying that the Buddha is not a *pramāṇa* on the *sāṃvyaṅgī* level, but only on the absolute level,⁴⁰ would have caused much of a scandal. Moreover, it is a distortion of Dharmakīrti's writings to say that according to him there is "no certainty" about the Buddha's words. But even if this were the case, one also wonders why Dignāga was not chastised in the same manner, for the rejection of *āgama* as *pramāṇa* originated from him, not from Dharmakīrti. Krasser relies here on a study he published almost at the same time, "Logic in Religious Context: Dharmakīrti in Defence of *āgama*."⁴¹ I am not disinclined to believe that Dharmakīrti modified Dignāga's laconic statements on this point, but Krasser again pushes on to improbable conclusions. One of the problems throughout this paper is that Krasser does not distinguish the cases where Dharmakīrti speaks of the Buddha's word, or the Buddhist *āgama*, from the cases where he refers to the *āgamas* of other religious traditions. He also does not distinguish between instances where Dharmakīrti speaks about scripture as such (which has no validity of course), and scripture whose author has been proven to be reliable, which is to say, the Buddhist *āgama*. I would be surprised, for instance, if according to Dharmakīrti transcendent matters taught by the Buddha, such as karma, should be considered unreliable. I have also not seen any convincing evidence adduced by Krasser to back his claim that according to Dharmakīrti,

³⁹ Krasser does not give any reference to Dharmakīrti's writings here. One therefore wonders to which passages "several times" refers. I am not aware of such passages and also could not find any in Krasser 2001.

⁴⁰ See Krasser's own words in an earlier paper (2001: 185): "... for absolutely (*pāramārthika*) speaking the Buddha is considered to be a *pramāṇa*."

⁴¹ Krasser 2012b.

Dignāga's definition of *āgama* "is not only faulty, but also incompatible with his *apoha* theory" (2012b: 116). He also goes as far as to say that according to Dharmakīrti there is no relation (whatsoever) between words and objects.⁴² Even more serious is Krasser's neglect of the crucial distinction between the main part and the secondary part of the Buddhist *āgama*. The main part, namely, the four noble truths, is not transcendent, and thus it is not beyond the usual means of knowledge, but confirmed directly by them. Thus, when Krasser claims that according to Dharmakīrti's assessment of *āgama* it is "'purified' by an examination and thus *it might sometimes be reliable*" (my emphasis) (p. 102), this must be judged as highly tendentious.⁴³

Assuming that "the leaders of Nālandā" and "the religious authorities" (who supposedly lack wisdom) had grasped the subtleties of Dharmakīrti's departure from Dignāga, they would surely have also realized that Dharmakīrti considers the Buddha to be a *pramāṇa*. Krasser certainly goes too far when he asks (2012a: 586): "How were they [the leaders of institutions like Nālandā, E.F.] to propagate Buddhism if the Buddha is not even a *pramāṇa* ...?" (here even conveniently omitting the claimed, but doubtful restriction to the *sāṃvyaḥārika* level).⁴⁴

Krasser knows of course that Dharmakīrti said that the Buddha is, or has become, a *pramāṇa*. To understand his problematic presentation of Dharmakīrti's views on *āgama*, we have to recall that Krasser persistently maintains (see for instance p. 549) that the Buddha, according to Dharmakīrti, can only "metaphorically be called a *pramāṇa*."⁴⁵ Here we have to address another controversial study (Krasser 2001) in which Krasser relies on some of Dharmakīrti's commentators who explain that the Buddha is similar to the *pramāṇas* perception and inference inasmuch as his statements do not belie their promise and reveal a new object. From this, Krasser concludes simplistically that if the Buddha is only similar to a *pramāṇa* in the proper sense of the word,

⁴² See Krasser 2012b: 102 and 117.

⁴³ See similarly p. 105: "It is only under certain circumstances, namely when it has been completely checked and purified, that there might be a chance of proceeding successfully based on *āgama*."

⁴⁴ I am not sure how this relates to Krasser's own words in Krasser 2001 (p. 195): "... it is obvious only that the Bhagavat is said to be a *pramāṇa* on account of his revealing the four noble truths, etc., which amounts to a correspondence to *ajñātārthaprakāśa*, while *āptavāda*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* are said to be *pramāṇas* on account of their being reliable." In any case, the distinction seems to me to be unfounded and contradicts Dharmakīrti's statement in PV 2.7 (*tadvat pramāṇam bhagavān*, where *tadvat* refers to both *ajñātārthaprakāśa* and *avisamvādi jñānam*), even according to Krasser's understanding.

⁴⁵ Actually, it is far from certain that Dignāga or Dharmakīrti thought of the Buddha as a *pramāṇa* "metaphorically." This interpretation appears only in later commentaries.

he is not really a *pramāṇa* and therefore cannot be trusted (“there is no certainty whether what he has said about supersensible matters is true” [Krasser 2012a: 586]). I consider this to be a clear misrepresentation of Dharmakīrti’s words.

Krasser further concludes that Dharmakīrti seems to have been a “*persona non grata*” (Krasser 2012a: 586) and that Xuanzang did not mention him for this reason, even though he may have known him. But what does it mean to have been a *persona non grata* for the leaders of religious institutions like Nālandā?⁴⁶ Does it mean that one’s work was suppressed or ignored? Do we know of a single case where someone’s work was suppressed in Classical India? And even if this were the case, why did Bhāviveka take Dharmakīrti’s work into consideration? Or does being a *persona non grata* mean that one would be criticized by other scholars and religious authorities? And if so, why is Dharmakīrti not known as a target of criticism in Buddhist philosophical literature? And most importantly, what happened in the few decades that separate I Ching from Xuanzang? Why did the putative leaders of religious institutions like Nālandā change their minds about Dharmakīrti? And how did Dharmakīrti turn from being a *persona non grata* into a greatly honored master? And why did such a revolution not leave any traces in the subsequent literature?

As we have seen, Krasser’s essay creates more problems than it solves. But it is also a useful reminder that our current dating of Dharmakīrti as well as of practically all Indian philosophers from the sixth and seventh centuries does not rest on solid foundations and is to some extent suppositious.

Addendum: Why Dharmakīrti must have known Kumārila’s Bṛhaṭṭīkā

The positions of the Mīmāṃsaka opponent presupposed by Dharmakīrti are very similar to those of Kumārila, but not quite Kumārila’s positions⁴⁷ as we know them from the Ślokavārttika, as has been pointed out several times by John Taber.⁴⁸ In spite of intensive search conducted by several scholars, Krasser being one of them, hardly any direct references to the Ślokavārttika in the Pramāṇavārttika or other works of Dharmakīrti could be established (or vice

⁴⁶ Actually we have no evidence that Dharmakīrti ever set foot in Nālandā. It may be reminded that neither Bu ston nor Tārānātha associate him with this monastery.

⁴⁷ For instance, a discussion of *svataḥ prāmāṇyam*, a doctrine very central to Kumārila’s thought as expressed in the Ślokavārttika, is conspicuously missing in the Pramāṇavārttika.

⁴⁸ See Taber 2005: 169, n. 76, with references. However, upon further research Taber has recently changed his mind and now maintains that in the Apoha section of the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti refers to Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga’s *apoha* theory in the Ślokavārttika.

versa, for that matter).⁴⁹ The extremely few candidates for such reference may be statements common to both the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* and the *Ślokavārttika* and thus do not necessarily testify to Dharmakīrti's familiarity with the *Ślokavārttika*.

Furthermore, the *Ślokavārttika* is probably the more mature work of Kumāriḷa. It is certainly the more authoritative one in the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition because all known commentaries on Kumāriḷa's work are on the *Ślokavārttika* (and *Tantravārttika*); none that we know of, not even just by name, was written on the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*.⁵⁰ Therefore, if Dharmakīrti was familiar with both works of Kumāriḷa, one would expect him to refer regularly to the more mature work.

The above observations are best explained by assuming that the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* is Kumāriḷa's earlier work, that Dharmakīrti was acquainted with it and that he did not know the *Ślokavārttika*.⁵¹

Yoshimizu has already argued that Kumāriḷa's logical theory was not developed in response to Dharmakīrti's, thereby refuting Frauwallner's influential theory

⁴⁹ John Taber kindly draws my attention to the following statement of Dharmakīrti in PVSV 124, 27: *tasmād adhyayanam adhyayanāntarapūrvakam adhyayanād iti*, which matches ŚV Vākya-dhikaraṇa 366a-c₁: *vedasyādhyayanam sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam / vedādhyayanatvāt*.

⁵⁰ As all known fragments of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* almost exclusively deal with the criticism of Buddhist philosophy, the anonymous referee who evaluated this paper suggests that the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* was Kumāriḷa's last work which remained incomplete and was therefore not commented upon. However, the fact that these fragments are thematically limited in this way does not necessarily indicate that Kumāriḷa's work was confined to the criticism of Buddhist philosophy and did not cover other topics addressed in Śabara's *Tarkapāda*, such as Vedic apologetics, *Mīmāṃsā* philosophy of language and so on, but may be due to the fact that Kumāriḷa's Buddhist opponents chose to concern themselves only with these portions of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*.

⁵¹ This assumption is made from the perspective of the Dharmakīrtian materials. Yoshimizu (2007a, 2007b and 2011) has studied the inner relationship of Kumāriḷa's works and arrived at a different conclusion, namely, that the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* postdates the *Ślokavārttika*. Clearly, if one could discover a direct reference to the *Ślokavārttika* in the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, this would be a decisive argument for determining the sequence of the two works. So far, Yoshimizu has not adduced such a reference. However, in Yoshimizu 2007a and 2011 he demonstrates convincingly that in his discussion of inference as seen in some fragments of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* Kumāriḷa attacks elements of Dignāga's theory of inference in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* whereas such criticism cannot be found in the *Anumānapariccheda* of his *Ślokavārttika* where he follows Dignāga's theory. The anonymous referee of this paper therefore postulates that in his early career Kumāriḷa adopted Buddhist logic which he considered superior to other current theories of inference within the Brahminical fold, but later in his life rejected Dignāga's logical theory in the wider context of his criticism of Buddhism as a heretical philosophical and religious tradition. From this perspective, one may indeed assume that the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* is the later work. Strictly speaking, there is no contradiction between Yoshimizu's hypothesis and mine: it is possible that the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* is the later work and that for this reason Dharmakīrti used it as his main target when criticizing the *Mīmāṃsā*. In this case, however, the relative neglect of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* by the later *Mīmāṃsā* tradition would still be puzzling. A more thorough investigation of the relationship between the *Ślokavārttika* and the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* is certainly a desideratum, and not merely for determining their relative chronology.

that when composing his *Bṛhaṭṭikā* Kumārila was responding to Dharmakīrti's *oeuvre*.⁵² He also suggested that certain verses in PV 1 (19ab, 34ab) may have been developed in response to the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*. However, no direct quotation could be identified so far. In the following, I will attempt to demonstrate that such a quotation can be found in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

Tattvaśāṅgraha (TS) 3150 (3149 in TS[S]) is generally considered to be a direct quotation from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*:

*gaṇitādyekadeśe tu sarveṣāṃ satyavādītā /
jinabuddhādisattvānāṃ viśeṣo nāvadhāryate //*

However, all living beings, the Jina, the Buddha and so on, speak the truth in a [certain] area [of knowledge such as] arithmetic and so forth; [thus] a distinction among them [as to who is omniscient and who is not] is not determined.

In his comments on this verse, Kamalaśīla briefly explains its content and then proceeds to substantiate its assertion that everybody may speak the truth about something by quoting from an unidentified source: *yathoktam – na hy ekaṃ nāsti satyārthaṃ puruṣe bahubhāṣiṅṅī*. “For it is not [the case] that when a man talks a lot, not [even] a single [word] is true.”⁵³ The interesting question is: Does this half-verse in the *Tattvaśāṅgrahapañjikā* come from the same source as the verse in the *Tattvaśāṅgraha*? Already Frauwallner suggested that Śāntarakṣita does not quote from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* continuously, but occasionally abbreviates his exposition and seems to skip over some verses.⁵⁴ This supposition seems reasonable when one notices that practically the same half-verse also appears in *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* (PVA) 1.367 (p. 51):

*ekadeśaparijñānaṃ kasya nāma na vidyate /
na hy ekaṃ nāsti satyārthaṃ puruṣe bahukalpake //*

Who does not have comprehensive knowledge in a [certain] area [of knowledge]? For it is not [the case] that when a man contemplates a lot, not [even] a single [cognition] is true.⁵⁵

⁵² See Yoshimizu 2007a and Frauwallner 1962. In this connection, the anonymous reviewer of this paper also draws my attention to Yoshimizu's elaborate refutation of Kataoka's defense of Frauwallner's theory with reference to the issue of the Buddha's omniscience (Kataoka 2011: 48-51 and 366-369, n. 425-426) in Yoshimizu 2015b, which is an enlarged Japanese version of Yoshimizu 2015a. Yoshimizu shows that there is no evidence for Kataoka's assumption of a marked difference in Kumārila's criticism of the Buddha's omniscience in the *Ślokavārttika* and the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*. He also points out that in the known fragments of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* Kumārila nowhere refers to compassion as the Buddha's motivation to teach when he refutes the Buddha's omniscience. See Yoshimizu 2015b: 10-13, n. 33. Of course, it is not possible to draw a definite conclusion from Kumārila's silence on compassion in the few preserved fragments of the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*.

⁵³ See also the translation in Jha 1937: II/1402.

⁵⁴ Frauwallner 1962: 82 (= 1982: 327).

⁵⁵ This verse is also translated in Moriyama 2014: 76.

The context in both the *Tattvaśāṅgraha* and the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* is the same. Both authors summarize the *Mīmāṃsā* critique of an implied, obviously faulty argument meant to substantiate the reliability of authoritative founders of religious traditions. The rhetorical question in the first half of PVA 1.367 corresponds to the claim made in TS 3150, which is more elaborate. The second half of the verse in the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* is practically identical to the half-verse quoted by Kamalaśīla. The main difference is that in the former there is a reference to much thinking rather than talking. I assume that this is due to a modification by *Prajñākaragupta* in order to connect the implied argument more directly to omniscience, which has to do primarily with knowing and only secondarily with speaking or teaching.

As shown by Shinya Moriyama, most of the *Mīmāṃsaka* opponent's objections in the passage PVA 1.358-370 (p. 50-51) are based on the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*. However, one has to note that the verse immediately preceding the one quoted above, namely PVA 1.366, actually refers to the position of a different *Mīmāṃsaka* who is quoted in another section of the *Tattvaśāṅgraha* (TS 3249) and identified with *Sāmaṭa* and *Yājñata*. This has been pointed out by Masahiro Inami in a paper published in 1996.⁵⁶ Even so, I think that PVA 1.367 can be attributed to the *Bṛhaṭṭikā* because *Prajñākaragupta* is eclectic in his presentation of the *Mīmāṃsā* position and does not limit himself to a single source. PVA 1.367-369 are very similar to TS 3149, 3168 and 3195, respectively, all of which are considered to be quotations from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*.

Therefore, if we had to rely on the above quotation in the *Tattvaśāṅgrahapañjikā* and PVA 1.367cd alone, we would certainly deem it very probable that this half-verse (with a slight variation in the PVA) comes from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*. However, the situation becomes more complicated when one considers that the same half-verse, in the variant attested by Kamalaśīla, appears as PV 1.335cd:

na hy ekaṃ nāsti satyārthaṃ puruṣe bahubhāṣiṇi /

In PV 1.335 *Dharmakīrti* states his own view. *Dharmakīrti*'s opponent in this section (PV 1.330f.) is an unidentified "old *Mīmāṃsaka*" (*vṛddhamīmāṃsaka*).⁵⁷ In my view, we have two alternatives here to explain the whole situation. The first is that both Kamalaśīla and *Prajñākaragupta*, when referring to a *Mīmāṃsā* argument against omniscience, actually quote *Dharmakīrti* rather than a *Mīmāṃsā* source, and this, as far as I can tell, independently of each other because there is no further indication that *Prajñākaragupta* follows Kamalaśīla's presentation here. The second alternative would be that *Dharmakīrti* is quoting the same *Mīmāṃsā* source as the one used by Kamalaśīla and *Prajñākaragupta*, in

⁵⁶ See the reference in Moriyama 2014: 248, n. 26.

⁵⁷ See Eltschinger's introduction in Eltschinger 2012: 18, n. 40.

which case he would most probably quote the Bṛhaṭṭikā. I think that the second alternative is more probable because there is no reason why both Kamalaśīla and Prajñākara Gupta would quote a statement by Dharmakīrti when referring to a Mīmāṃsā argument.⁵⁸ Thus, one may assume that Dharmakīrti quotes Kumāriḥ here, perhaps ironically applying a statement by Kumāriḥ directed against the notion of the Buddha's omniscience in his, Dharmakīrti's, own criticism of an earlier representative of the Mīmāṃsā tradition.

Another place where Dharmakīrti most probably refers to the Bṛhaṭṭikā is in PV 2.120ff. A precondition for the possibility of the Buddha's compassion is the possibility of an infinite increase of mental properties like compassion. Dharmakīrti's opponent claims that there are natural limits to mental properties or moral excellences, just as to physical achievements: no matter how long and how intensively one practises jumping, one will never be able to jump up a distance of several miles; similarly one cannot heat water beyond a certain temperature and turn it into fire. In the same manner, no matter how long the Buddha may practise compassion towards all living beings, he will never attain the infinite compassion postulated by the Buddhists. The opponent in PV 2.120 claims:

*abhyāsenā viśeṣe 'pi laṅghanodakatāpavat /
svabhāvātikramo mā bhūd iti cet ... //*

Even if an excellence [is attained] by repeated practice, one cannot go beyond one's own nature, just like in [the case of] jumping and heating water ...

Manorathanandin ad loc. explains:

*na hi puruṣo 'tyarthaṃ laṅghane kṛtābhyāso yojanam ardhayojanaṃ vā laṅgha-
yati.*

For a man does not jump [up] a *yojana* or half a *yojana*, [even if he has exercised] jumping excessively.

The same argument appears in TS 3168 (= TS[S] 3167), assumed to be a quote from the Bṛhaṭṭikā:

*daśahastāntaram vyomno [read vyomni?] yo nāmotplutya gacchati /
na yojanam asau gantum śakto 'bhyāsaśatair api //*

[A man] who [after repeated practice] jumps up in the air for a distance of ten *hastas* is not able to go [up] a *yojana* even after hundreds [of times] of practice.

Moriyama kindly informs me that this correspondence has already been pointed out by Inami.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ A third alternative, namely, that all three are using, with some variation, a popular saying not originally related to the Mīmāṃsā argument, seems less probable to me because the statement is narrowly tailored onto the *ekadeśa* argument. Further, the implicitness of the antecedent of *ekam* and the use of the particle *hi* speak against this alternative.

⁵⁹ See Inami 1986.

Frauwallner's hypothesis has been taken for granted for decades and thus until Yoshimizu's ground-breaking study of 2007 no serious investigation into the relationship between the Pramāṇavārttika and the supposed quotes from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā had been undertaken. The above considerations are meant as a further step into this direction. With cautious optimism I assume that upon additional research more correspondences between the two works could be found that would show that the Bṛhaṭṭīkā must have been Dharmakīrti's main target when criticizing the Mīmāṃsā.

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