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Yamāri and the Order of Chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika*

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Yamāri and the Order of Chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika* *

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In his inspiring keynote lecture to this conference and introduction to the present volume, Sheldon Pollock has briefly sketched some salient features of philology as comprising the edition and interpretation of texts, and as involving a number of presuppositions, notably, that a given text has an original proper form, was created by a single individual, has undergone changes in the course of history (*i.e.*, the history of its transmission), and that one should strive to regain the original form of a text as it was composed by its single, coherent author. As such, philology is, of course, not an invention of 18th century Europe, but rather existed long before in various scholarly traditions, European and non-European, especially in South ¹ and East Asia. In this connection, Pollock also raises the question

*. An earlier draft of this paper was read at the workshop “Chance and Contingency in Indian Philosophy” organized by Phyllis Granoff at Yale University in May 2017. I thank all the participants of the workshop, especially Professor Granoff, for their perceptive comments. I also thank my wife Karin Preisendanz for numerous intensive and fruitful discussions on Yamāri and his commentary. The editorial work on Yamāri’s *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Suparīśuddhā* would not have been possible without the scholarly cooperation between Leipzig University and the China Tibetology Research Center, Beijing, and a very generous grant of the German Research Council (DFG project FR 2531/10: Yamāri’s *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Suparīśuddhā*, diplomatic and critical editions, partial translation and studies). The research on this paper was also supported by an Academy of Korean Studies (KSPS) Grant funded by the Korean Government (MOE) (AKS-2012-AAZ-2102). Thanks are also due to the “anonymous” referee for his careful reading and useful comments.

1. Pollock considers this as beginning in 10th century Kashmir. I assume that this date could be pushed back at least by a few centuries. A fascinating case would be Dharmakīrti’s philological (or philologico-philosophical) considerations of Dignāga’s work. It is true that we tend to distrust Dharmakīrti’s philological arguments concerning Dignāga’s original intention. However, even if these arguments are judged to be distortive, they are nonetheless philological in nature and testify to the existence of such arguments in the 7th century at the very latest.

of why we should care about these past philological practises. In this paper I would like to shed some light on the discussion initiated by Pollock by presenting the well-known case of the disconcerting order of chapters in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (hereafter *PV*). This topic is particularly suitable for our purpose because it was repeatedly discussed by modern scholars of Buddhism as well as by traditional Buddhist commentators, and thus their different and indeed not-so-different approaches to the problem can be clearly compared. As we shall see, the discussion illustrates nicely a considerable number of the essential features that Pollock finds in philology, but also reflects some features that have not been taken into consideration.

THE PROBLEM

The problem in the overall structure of the *PV* can be summarised as follows. The *PV* is supposed to be a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (hereafter *PS*), and yet its order of chapters follows that of the *PS* only partly. The chapter on inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) was transmitted as the first chapter of the *PV* and not, as might be expected, after the chapter on perception; further, this chapter stands apart from the other chapters of the *PV*, for it is the only chapter that is accompanied by an auto-commentary. Furthermore, chapters 4-6 of the *PS* were not commented on in the *PV*. These discrepancies can be seen in [table 1](#).

Table 1 – The order of chapters in *PS* and *PV*

PS	PV
Initial verse	1) Inference for oneself*
1) Perception	2) Initial verse
2) Inference for oneself	3) Perception
3) Inference for others	4) Inference for others
4) Examples & pseudo-examples	
5) Apoha (phil. of language)†	
6) False objections (<i>jāti</i>)	

* Only this chapter is accompanied by auto-commentary.

† The content of this chapter is included in *PV* chapter 1.

THE DOMINANT PARADIGM IN MODERN SCHOLARSHIP ON DHARMAKĪRTI'S WORK

The Buddhist tradition and modern scholarship have different, in some respects diametrically opposed, views on the scope and chronological ordering of Dharmakīrti's works. Practically all modern scholars follow Frauwallner's theory suggested more than sixty years ago. In his path-breaking paper of 1954, "Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrtis [The Sequence and the Arising of Dharmakīrti's Works]," Frauwallner sketched for the first time the broad outlines of Dharmakīrti's entire oeuvre. I will limit my remarks here to his interpretation of the order of chapters in the PV.² The PV is supposed to be a commentary on the PS, which contains six chapters; Dharmakīrti's commentary, however, has only four. Moreover, the Buddhist tradition transmitted these chapters in an unusual order, as mentioned above. Frauwallner disregards the traditional explanations (cf. below) and looks for biographical (non-systemic) and psychological reasons for this oddity.

First, he observes that unlike chapters 2-4, the first chapter is not really a commentary on PS ch. 2, and he concludes that it was written originally as an independent work on logical reasons; he even makes up a hypothetical title for this work: *Hetuprakaraṇa*. He further assumes that this independent work already existed before Dharmakīrti began writing the PV and that it was in fact a highly original, but chaotic ("wirr") work of youth. Further, Frauwallner considers the PV to be an incomplete work: chapter 4 of the PV ends abruptly and chapters 4-6 of the PS are not commented on at all. Upon interrupting the PV, Dharmakīrti placed his earlier work on reasons at the beginning of the PV and added some verses at the beginning and the end to tie the two works together. This assumption also explains why PV I is the only chapter with auto-commentary. On the PV proper (i.e., the other three chapters, which were conceived as a commentary on the PS), Dharmakīrti never composed a commentary. What caused Dharmakīrti to abandon his work cannot be said with certainty, but there are some indications. From the initial and final verses of the PV, it is clear that Dharmakīrti did not enjoy the success he had expected, and perhaps for this reason he stopped his work on the PV and began a new, shorter, more effective work, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (hereafter PVin), where he could present his own system without being encumbered by

2. For a more extensive summary, see Franco (2017).

Table 2 – The order of chapters and *explanandum* of the PV

Object	Inference 1 st	Pramāṇasiddhi 1 st
PV on PS	Dev, Śākya(1), Karṇa, Prajñā(?), Ravi	Manorathanandin
PV on <i>pravacana</i>	Yamāri	Jayanta
PV on both	Śākyabuddhi(2)	

unnecessary references to Dignāga's work.

One may recall at this point Pollock's characterisation of philology as seeking coherence and unity of meaning. This has to be supplemented by the other side of the same coin, namely, the tendency to fragment and stratify the transmitted works, for if the meanings, or the assumed meanings, are many, the authors too would be assumed to be many. In the present case, the identity of the author is not questioned, but parts of the work are relegated to different stages in his career.

TRADITIONAL BUDDHIST EXPLANATIONS

The opposite approach can be seen in the traditional commentaries that try to make sense of the peculiar order of chapters from a systemic point of view and put the emphasis on establishing the coherence of the text, as well as on philosophical and didactic considerations (see below). One of the interesting points that has emerged in these discussions concerns the very nature of the PV: Is it really a commentary (*vārttika*) on Dignāga's PS or rather a commentary on the Buddha's word (*pravacana*)? Or perhaps on both? The traditional commentators, who always presuppose the PV to be a single, unified and coherent work, could opt for either of these alternatives. Their various positions on this question, juxtaposed with their positions on the ordering of chapters, are conveniently presented in table 2.

In presenting the approach taken by the traditional commentators, I shall put special emphasis on Yamāri's *Pramāṇavārttikālankāraṭīkā Supariśuddhā* (first half of the 11th c.) for no less than four reasons. First, Yamāri's work contains the most thorough discussion of the subject that has survived. Second, although outstanding in its quality and sophistication, Yamāri's discussion has so far been available only in an often incom-

prehensible Tibetan translation and therefore was largely ignored. A unique Sanskrit manuscript of this work on the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* (hereafter *PVA*) has only recently emerged and its *editio princeps* is now being prepared by a team of scholars at Leipzig University.³ Third, Yamāri stands last in a long and illustrious line of South Asian commentators (Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Karṇakagomin, Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta, Jayanta and others) and thus has the last word on the subject before it was taken up in the Tibetan tradition of commentaries on the *PV*. Fourth, Yamāri is the great exception among traditional commentators, and we shall see that in the final analysis his nuanced approach is not that different from that of Frauwallner's by taking not only systemic, but also biographical considerations into account; this, however, did not prevent them to reach diametrically opposed conclusions.

Much of the relevant material from the 7th to the 11th century is now lost in its original Sanskrit and is available only in Tibetan translations that cause numerous difficulties of understanding. We are fortunate, however, to be able to rely on Motoi Ono's previous work on this subject. In a ground-breaking study (Ono 1997), Ono collected, translated and explained almost all the relevant materials on our topic (with the notable exception of Yamāri's work). Ono's work was continued by Birgit Kellner who considered the same materials from a new perspective of interreligious debate (Kellner 2004).

Let us begin however with Devendrabuddhi, the earliest commentator and presumably Dharmakīrti's direct disciple,⁴ and work forward in time toward Yamāri. The key phrase on this topic by Devendrabuddhi preserved in the loose pages appended by Sāṅkṛtyāyana to the edition of *PV* and quoted by Ono (1997: 702) and Kellner (2004: 150):

*ācāryīyapramāṇalakṣaṇaśāstravyākhyānibandhanānumānaṃ vyavasthāpya prastutena pramāṇam ityādinā namaskāraślokaḥ vyākhyānam ārambhate.*⁵

3. I am pleased to announce that the DFG approved the funding of the project until 2021.

4. We have no reason to doubt the authenticity of this tradition; what is remarkable, however, is that Devendrabuddhi's comments are not always reliable, as could be expected from a direct disciple. This unreliability was noted already by the Indo-Tibetan tradition (see also Yamāri's unique explanation below) as well as by modern scholars.

5. The portion in Roman letters was reconstructed by Kellner on the basis of the Tibetan.

Having established inference, which is a precondition to the explanation of the treatise on the characteristics of *pramāṇas* by the Teacher [Dignāga], [Dharmakīrti] begins the explanation of the salutation verse, as now is the appropriate occasion, with [the words] “a means of knowledge [is a cognition that does not belie its promise].”⁶

This statement that inference is a precondition for the explanation of Dignāga’s treatise is repeated in the introductions to the other chapters (*i.e.*, perception and inference for another). Devendrabuddhi considers inference to be a reason (*rgyu*) or a precondition (*nibandhana*) for Dignāga’s treatise which deals with the characteristics of *pramāṇa*. So the actual commentary can begin only after establishment of inference. It can thus be said that Dharmakīrti does not really change the order of chapters, but only adds a prolegomenon to the discussion. The actual commentary begins, as one would expect, with the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter. Even though it is not stated explicitly, one may assume that for Devendrabuddhi the prolegomenon is largely identical with what would be found in a chapter on inference for oneself and for this reason it does not appear between the chapters on perception and on inference for another.⁷ Thus, the discrepancies between the two works (as presented above in table 1, p. 248) look much less awkward; they are presented in table 3, p. 253.

Śākyabuddhi, Devendrabuddhi’s commentator, gives two alternative interpretations of the above-quoted phrase [see Śākya(1) and Śākya(2) in table 2, p. 250]. The one relies on the introductory words in the PVSV 1,8f.: *arthānarthavivecanasyānumānāśrayatvāt tadvipratipattes tadvyavasthāpanāya āha ...*⁸

Artha and *anartha* are the correct and incorrect characteristics of *pramāṇas*, which Śākyabuddhi relates to Dignāga and non-Buddhists respectively. The distinction between *artha* and *anartha* is preceded by inference. Therefore, inference is needed before the correct definition of per-

6. This is of course a reference to v. 1 of the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādjñānam*.

7. To my knowledge, none of the commentators raises the question why the other chapters (4-6) of the PS are not commented on. If we were able to ask them, they would presumably answer that the topics covered by these chapters are either already contained in the PV, *e.g.* Apoha is dealt with extensively in PV I, or else that they are treated in other works of Dharmakīrti, *e.g.*, false objections (*jāti*) are treated in the *Vādanyāya*.

8. See the extensive discussion of this sentence in Steinkellner (2013, vol. 2, n. 4, p. 5-15).

Table 3 – PV in relation to PS according to Devendrabuddhi

PS	PV
	Prolegomenon
Initial verse	Initial verse
Perception	Perception
Inference for oneself	(dealt with in the Prolegomenon)
Inference for others	Inference for others

ception and inference can be examined. This explanation largely agrees with Devendrabuddhi's explanation.

Śākyabuddhi's second explanation of the phrase *ācāryīyapramāṇa-lakṣaṇaśāstra*vyākhyānibandhanānumānaṃ vyavasthāpya is grammatically less convincing, but all the more astute and thought-provoking: The inference of the teacher is a precondition for Dharmakīrti's explanation of the *śāstra*,⁹ that is, the Buddha's word, which consists of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) and provides the true characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of such fundamental Buddhist concepts as the five psycho-physical constituents of living beings (*skandha*), the twelve bases (*āyatana*), or the eighteen elements (*dhātu*). It is on the basis of inference that Dharmakīrti will explain, in the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, that the Buddha's words are correct and that those of non-Buddhist teachers are not.¹⁰

We can understand this statement as allocating different chapters to different *mūla* works: the Svārthānumāna chapter comments on Dignāga's PS, and the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter on the Buddha's word.¹¹ This is actually quite correct, for most of the latter chapter comments on topics such as the Buddha's trustworthiness, the four noble truths, karma and rebirth and so on, and only uses the five epithets of Dignāga to expound Dharmakīrti's philosophical defense of the Buddhist religious tradition.

9. He evokes in this connection the traditional "etymology" of *śāstra* as *śās* weapon and *tra* (=trā) protecting.

10. PVKP 517,29-518,2: *lakṣyante skandhadhātvyātanāni yena śāstreṇa tal lakṣaṇaśāstraṃ tripiṭakam. pramāṇaṃ ca tad, avisaṃvāditvāt, lakṣaṇaśāstraṃ ceti pramāṇalakṣaṇaśāstraṃ bhāgavatpravacanam*. See also Kellner (2004: 155).

11. Concerning the other chapters of the PV, not mentioned here, they should probably also be considered as commentary on the PS.

Table 4 – Śākyabuddhi's second interpretation

PS, chap. on inference ← PV I (Svārthānumāna)
 Buddha's word ← PV II (Pramāṇasiddhi)

Closely related to Śākyabuddhi's commentary is Karṇakagomin's commentary (*ṭīkā*) on both Dharmakīrti's chapter on inference and his auto-commentary thereon. Practically all of Śākyabuddhi's commentary on this chapter appears as part of Karṇakagomin's, but the direction of influence between these two is disputed. Gnoli (introduction to PVSV, p. xxi) proposed that Śākyabuddhi, who commented on all four chapters, used for his commentary on the first the (assumed pre-existing) commentary by Karṇakagomin. Steinkellner (1977: 217), on the other hand, maintained that Karṇakagomin integrated Śākyabuddhi's commentary into his own. The matter must be investigated more thoroughly before a definitive conclusion can be reached, but whatever the case may be, Karṇakagomin's position is like Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's first interpretation.¹²

Prajñākaragupta's position is not entirely clear. He does not discuss the order of chapters in the PV, but in the introduction to the Parārthānumāna chapter he states (PVA 437.4): *svārthānumānānantaraṃ parārthānumānam ucyate*. "Immediately after inference for oneself, inference for another is explained." This statement could indeed be interpreted to mean that Prajñākaragupta considered the chapter on inference for oneself to immediately precede the chapter on inference for another and thus be chapter three (after the chapter on perception). However, the statement is too laconic and can be interpreted in various ways. In my opinion, the fact that Prajñākaragupta does not problematize the issue, and perhaps more importantly the fact that Ravigupta follows the traditional order as presupposed by Devendrabuddhi make it unlikely that Prajñākaragupta was suggesting changing the order of chapters. Yamāri discusses this state-

12. See PVT 4.28: *yadi pramāṇasamuccayavyākhyāṃ cikīrṣur ācāryadharmakīrtiḥ kasmāt svātantryeṇānumānaṃ vyavashāpayatīti...* See also 5.21-22: *niścāyayiṣyate cāyam artho [viz., svataḥ parataś ca prāmāṇyaniścayaḥ] dvitīyapariccheda iti na iha [i.e., in the Svārthānumāna chapter] pratanyate*. From the very limited perspective of the discussion on the order of chapters, it seems that Karṇakagomin does not know Śākyabuddhi.

ment in Ms. 7b7f.¹³, and claims that the word *anantara* does not refer to inference for oneself as *immediately* preceding inference for other, but rather simply as precluding that the latter should come before the former.¹⁴ Further, we do not have explicit statements by Prajñākaragupta and Ravigupta on the scope of the PV. I therefore assume that they follow Devendrabuddhi on this point as well.

Turning now to Jayanta, again the Tibetan translation is difficult and problematic, but we have a close paraphrase of Jayanta's position in Yamāri's text. Indeed one of the ancillary merits of this text is that it provides quotations and close paraphrases of Jayanta's work. The discussion begins as follows (Ms. 5b2-4):

*nanu tathāpi katham idam ādivākyam, madhye praṇīyamānatvāt?
iti cet. atra kecit — sāmānyalakṣaṇam antareṇāpramāṇād vedādeḥ
na lakṣaṇapratipattir iti sāmānyalakṣaṇābhīdhānārthaṃ prathamā-
paricchedaḥ. tataḥ svārthaprakarsamūlatvāt pratyakṣaprakaraṇam,
svārthānumānaṃ tu pratyakṣādhīnaprāmāṇyaṃ pratyakṣāt paścāt,
tadanantaram parārthānumānam iti. tad asyām ānupūrvyaṃ kutaḥ
codyāvātaraḥ? iti.*

Objection: How could this be the initial statement since it is composed in the middle? On this some (*i.e.*, Jayanta and his followers) say: Without a general definition [of the means of knowledge] — since the Veda and so on are not means of knowledge — there is no understanding of the definition [of the means of knowledge]. Therefore, the first chapter (*i.e.*, *Pramāṇasiddhi*) has the purpose of stating the general definition [of *pramāṇas*]. After it, [comes] the chapter on perception because it is based on the highest degree of one's own purpose.¹⁵ As for inference for oneself, whose validity depends on perception, [it comes] after perception. Immediately afterwards [comes] inference for another. Thus, what could be reprehensible in this order [of chapters]?

Yamāri then reports others¹⁶ who support or corroborate this opinion

13. All references and quotations from Yamāri's work are based on forthcoming edition by Chu, Franco and Li; see the DFG project mentioned above. As the pages of the editions are not yet finalized, references are given to folio and line of the manuscript.

14. Ms. 7b7f.: *yat punar vakṣyati svārthānumānānantaram parārthānumānam ucyaṭa iti, tatra nānantarye tātparyam, api tu vyatikramāṇeḥ. yathā hi pratyakṣam atikramyānumānaṃ pūrvam uktaṃ vyākhyānibandhanam, tathā sarvārambhaḥ parārtha iti, kiṃ parārthaḥ svārthānumānāt pūrvam?*

15. This refers to Dignāga's commentary on the initial verse, in which the Buddha is said to have accomplished *svārthasampat* and *parārthasampat*.

16. I was not able to identify these "others".

(Ms. 5b4):

*santi cānye 'pi tadanuvaktāraḥ - devendrādayas tu paricchedanupūrvyāṃ
bhrāntāḥ, ācāryeṇa cānumānasya prathamam vyākhyānam vaiṣamyād
ity upaskurvanti.*

There are others who reiterate [this opinion] and elaborate: Devendra and so on are mistaken about the order of chapters, and the explanation by the teacher [Dharmakīrti] of inference first¹⁷ is due to its being unequal to (or being more difficult than¹⁸) the other chapters.

Jayanta places the order of chapters in the context of the interreligious disputation between Buddhism and the Brahmanical tradition: Lacking a general definition, the Veda and so on are not means of knowledge and therefore one cannot understand the definition of means of knowledge from them. For this reason, Jayanta says, the general definition of means of knowledge is stated in chapter 1, the *Pramāṇasiddhi*-chapter, in order to show that they do not comply with this definition. As for the order of the remaining chapters, he alludes to Dignāga's comments on the Buddha as someone who has achieved perfection in cause and effect (*hetu-* and *phalasampat*) and he relates the remaining chapters of the *PV* to these perfections: The chapter on perception is based on perfection of his own purpose (*svārthasampat*). Inference for oneself depends on perception and comes therefore after it (and it also belongs to perfection of his own purpose?); following this comes the inference for another, which represents perfection of the purpose of others (*parārthasampat*).

Yamāri, however, disagrees strongly. Were one to accept this order of chapters, he says, this would imply that the order of the teacher himself (that is, Dharmakīrti) is not suitable. It is impossible to deny that the order transmitted by Devendrabuddhi is faithful to Dharmakīrti. Trying to do so would be like trying to block the disk of the sun with one's hand (*tad etat kareṇa kiraṇamālimaṇḍalapidhānasāhasam anuhati*). If Jayanta claims that the order he proposes (with *Pramāṇasiddhi* as first chapter) is the one actually adapted by Dharmakīrti, this is not convincing because this opinion is contradicted by well-known and well-established tradition.

17. "Explained first" (*prathamam vyākhyānam*) should probably be understood not as meaning that the chapter on inference is the first chapter of the *PV*, but rather that it was the starting point for Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary (assuming that he planned but was then not able to continue on to the other chapters).

18. It's not entirely clear which meaning of *vaiṣamya* these "others" have in mind; the Tib. translates *dka' ba*.

The transmission has its origin in Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti's personal disciple. If that transmission cannot be trusted, one may also distrust the content of the PV, especially the general definition of the means of knowledge as a cognition that does not belie its promise. If Jayanta maintains that the reason to trust the PV is that it is correct (*yuktatva*), then it is better to think, in view of the overwhelming evidence, simply that the order is incorrect, rather than to deny that it is Dharmakīrti's own doing. After all, Dharmakīrti is not a *pramāṇa* and can be mistaken.¹⁹ But wouldn't it be better to say that one does not understand the order? What reason could have possibly caused Devendrabuddhi to misunderstand and misrepresent the right order?²⁰

Again, how could Devendrabuddhi make such a mistake about the order of chapters? Such a mistake cannot be due to him observing Dharmakīrti explaining inference first. A teacher may explain any part of a work first without the student becoming confused that this part is the beginning of the explained treatise.²¹ Moreover, there is nothing wrong if the beginning of the PV, the initial statement, is about inference and not about the *pramāṇas* in general. The criticism of Jayanta and the "others" continues, but it would be tedious to summarize it here in its entirety.²² Let me come instead to Yamāri's own explanation. What is the final truth about the order of chapters in the PV?

Devendrabuddhi, Yamāri says, did not study the PV with Dharmakīrti, but only the PS. He became a follower of Dharmakīrti for that purpose alone, that is, because he was interested in the PS, not in the PV. Furthermore, Devendrabuddhi came to have a special mental formation or disposition (*saṃskāraviśeṣa*) due to the explanations of Dharmakīrti, who is an ocean of self-confidence without limits and who harbors strong at-

19. Ms. 5b7: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam ityādāv api ka āśvāsaḥ? iti. yuktatvam āśvāsa-hetur iti cet. ayuktatvam eva varaṃ tadānupūrvyām astu, na tv anācāryiyatvam. na hi puruṣa-pramāṇyaṃ nāma sādhanam ācāryasyāpi sammatam.*

20. Ms. 5b7-6a1: *yuktatve cācāryiyatvaṃ kiṃ niśidhyate? ātmano 'pratipattir eva kiṃ nābhi-dhīyate? devendrasyaṃpi tadānupūrvyām vyākhyāne kiḍṣaḥ śaktipratighāto yenānyathollikhya lekhaṇāśramam āśrayet? ...*

21. Ms. 6a1-2: *prathamam anumānavyākhyānaṃ bhramahetur iti cet. tad ayuktam. na hi pustake 'nyatra vyākhyānam paśyato 'pi vyākhyānakramabhedamātreṇa granthe 'pi krama-bhedāvadhāraṇaṃ kvacit, phakkikāsv api sahasraśas tathā prasaṅgāt. na ca śīśur api bhūpādam ādau śṛṇvan tam eva prathamapādam avadhārayati.*

22. I plan to translate the entire discussion in a forthcoming paper in the Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasien.

tachment to Dignāga, so that he, Devendrabuddhi, also came to have this attachment to Dignāga.²³ One has to note the pejorative term *abhiniveśa* that is attributed by Yamāri to both Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi; it is a typical Abhidharma term that refers to strong attachment or clinging that is usually accompanied by false notions or false conceptualisations.

In Yamāri's view, Devendrabuddhi projected onto the *PV* the assumption that he could understand it without instruction, and he contemplated various passages in it which dispel Dignāga's mistakes. Then, determining (falsely) that the *PV* is a *Vārttika* on Dignāga, Devendrabuddhi ventured to compose his own work/commentary, the *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*.²⁴ So here it is clear: The *PV* is not a commentary on Dignāga's PS, but on the Buddha's word; and it is Devendrabuddhi's mistake to have misunderstood the frequent references that Dharmakīrti makes to Dignāga — due to strong attachment, and because of his particular interest in Dignāga — and to have taken the *PV* to be a commentary on Dignāga.

Furthermore, Dharmakīrti, whose capacity was impaired due to old age (*jarasopahataśakti*), neglected to compose a commentary on the remaining chapters of the *PV*. Particularly, he was "lazy" (*ālasyam evācaritaṃ*) about taking charge of the succession of tradition (*saṃpradāyagrahaṇa*).²⁵

The following was his intention: First the proof of *pramāṇas* in general will unfold from the principal content (*mukhyakrameṇa*). The additional superimposition that the *PV* is a *Vārttika* on Dignāga does no harm, that is, it is not an obstruction to the main subject matter.²⁶ What Yamāri seems to be saying here is that Dharmakīrti knew of Devendrabuddhi's misinterpretation of the *PV* as a *Vārttika* on Dignāga, but he was not bothered by it, or saw no harm in it, and therefore did not bother to correct it, assuming that the students (*śrotāraḥ*), when they do not understand extremely profound matters (*atyantagambhīrasyānavabodhe*), will in the end make the Buddha into *pramāṇa*, even if only because of that. If there would be

23. Ms. 7b1-2: *tad ayam atra paramārthaḥ — na khalu vārttikakārād vārttikaṃ sākṣād ācārya-devendreṇa śrutam, api tu dignāga eva. tadartham evācāryam asāv anusītaḥ. tatra ca tasyābhiniveśāvasāyino niratīśayapraudhivāridher vārttikakārasya vyākhyānād ācāryadevendrah tathā saṃskāraviśeṣam adhijagāma, yathā vārttikakārasya dignāgābhiniveśam.*

24. Ms. 7b2-3: *vārttike copadeśānapekṣabodhābhimānaṃ cāropya dignāgadoṣadālanāni ca sthānāsthānāni samikṣya tadvārttikatvam eva niścītya granthakaranam utsehe.*

25. Ms. 7b3: *vārttikakāreṇa jarasopahataśaktinā śeṣabhāṣyakaraṇaṃ tāvad upekṣitam, viśeṣeṇa saṃpradāyagrahaṇe 'py ālasyam evācaritaṃ.*

26. Ms. 7b3-4: *ayaṃ cābhīprāyaḥ — abhimatapramāṇasādhanam tāvad bhaviṣyaty eva mukhyakrameṇa. dignāge ca vārttikatvāropo 'dhiko na bādhakaḥ.*

someone highly intelligent, then there would also be an awakening to the highest truth (*paramārbodha*), here perhaps the ultimate meaning of the PV.²⁷ Neither Dharmakīrti nor Devendrabuddhi comes out of this explanation looking good.

To conclude, since the tradition was not handed down to Devendrabuddhi (*devendre sampradāyasaṃkrānter abhāvād*), his mistake in relation to the topic is understandable. Or even if there was no mistake, because Devendrabuddhi had a special attachment (*abhiniveśa* again) to Dignāga, he may have connected the PV to the PS. But no such mistake is possible in respect to the order of chapters, which is conveyed in a written form (*likhitasamcarita*), especially because they are marked with names such as “first chapter”, “second chapter”, and so on. And one does not reject or change the order of chapters in the PV because it does not correspond to the PS, thinking: “there, in the PS, the explanation of (or commentary on) the praise of the Buddha (*stotravyākhyāna*) is appropriate in the first place.”

Therefore, the following is established: The order of chapters is just so as is well known, and it appertains to the Vārttikakāra, that is, to Dharmakīrti. Yamāri says that he will explain this further in the beginnings of the other chapters by conclusive arguments that precisely this order was accepted by Dharmakīrti (but unfortunately, the other chapters have not been discovered in Sanskrit yet).²⁸

Unlike the respectful and systematic discussions in the other sources, we see here an explanation that is akin to Frauwallner’s. The PV is an incomplete work. The commentary on the other chapters was not written not because it was not necessary, but because Dharmakīrti was old and lazy. Furthermore, he knew that the scope of his work was being misinterpreted by Devendrabuddhi, but he could not be bothered to correct it. However, against Frauwallner’s interpretation — and this poses a real challenge to modern Dharmakīrti philology — the PV, or at least the auto-commentary, according to Yamāri was composed by an old man. Quite probably he

27. Ms. 7b4: *atyantagambhīrasyaṇavabodhe ca tanmātreṇāpi bhagavantam ante pramāṇay-iṣyanti śrotāraḥ. prajñātīśayaśāli tu yadi kaścid bhaviṣyati, bhaviṣyati paramārbodho ’pīti.*

28. Ms. 7b4-6: *tasmād devendre sampradāyasaṃkrānter abhāvād abhidheye bhramo yuktaḥ. abhrame ’pi vā dignāgābhiniveśāt tatraiva yojayed vārttikam. na ca paricchedānupūrvyāṃ likhita-samcāritāyām evambhramāḥ, viśeṣataḥ prathamadvitīyādīnāmānikasambhavāt. nāpi dignāgānanukūlatvāt tatparihāraḥ, tatra hi stotravyākhyānam eva prathamam anukūlam iti. sthitam etat — yathāprasiddha eva paricchedakramo vārttikakārīya iti. upapattiyantareṇāpy eṣa eva kramo ’bhimata iti paricchedāntarārambhe vaksyāmaḥ.*

considered it to be his last work, incomplete because he was old, tired and lazy and not, as Frauwallner and his followers assume, his first work. Furthermore, even though it is not stated explicitly, Yamāri seems to imply that the PV and the PVSV were not composed at the same time; rather the PVSV was composed after the PV, that is, after the four chapters in verse were completed, and possibly also after other works of Dharmakīrti were composed in between. Can we really reject this opinion? Certainly, it makes us take a fresh look at Dharmakīrti's oeuvre.²⁹ Philology of the past clearly matters here.

With Yamāri's words in mind, let us look anew at the famously bitter introductory verse of the PV. Was it written by a young man who has barely started his career, as assumed by Frauwallner and practically everybody else, or by an old one, as assumed by Yamāri and the Indo-Tibetan tradition in general?³⁰

*prāyah prākṛtasaktir apratibalaprajñō janah kevalam nānarthī eva su-
bhāṣitaiḥ pariḡato vidveṣṭy apīrṣyāmalaiḥ |
tenāyaṃ na paropakāra itī naś cintāpi cetaś ciraṃ sūktābhyāsavivardhita-
vyasanam ity atra anubaddhaspṛham ||*

On the whole, people are attached to the vulgar, their wisdom/intelligence being deficient, they are not only disinterested in things well-said, but even have aversion to them, afflicted as they are by the impurity of jealousy/malice. Therefore, although I believe that this [work of mine] will not be useful for others, my mind has long since grown attached to repeating what is well-said and thus has become addicted to it.

Having sketched above the discussion on the order of chapters in the PV, we can now use it to substantiate, nuance and supplement the vision of traditional Indian philology as presented in the thoughtful remarks of Sheldon Pollock. To begin with, it is obvious that the discussion fulfils the so-called minimalist definition of philology as “making sense of texts”; to my knowledge, no South Asian commentary attempts to make “non-

29. One would have to start by checking the internal references in Dharmakīrti's work. However, here a word of caution is needed: Such references may have been added at a later time. Gnoli, to my knowledge the only one who criticized Frauwallner's hypothesis, pointed out that two of Abhinavagupta's works refer to one other. See his introduction to PVSV p. xvii, n. 2.

30. See Bu-ston (1932: 154): “After that (Dharmakīrti) composed his 7 treatises and, finally, an auto-commentary on the first chapter of the *Pramānavārttika*.”

sense” of the text it comments on.³¹ Further, just like Western philologists (Pollock quotes Whitney in this connection), Yamāri, as well as all the other commentators mentioned above, assume that there is “a true meaning” of a text and that this meaning is “one and not many.” Although the Buddhist tradition and modern scholarship have displayed different and indeed contrasting approaches to the topic of the order of chapters in the *PV* (the former considers the *PVSV* to be Dharmakīrti’s last work, the latter, his first), we should not lose sight of their common concerns. They both assume that there is a “correct order” of chapters in the *PV*, and that this order can and should be established and substantiated. Both also agree that the order transmitted by the tradition is unexpected or surprising. Further, among both groups we find voices that suggest that the order of chapters needs to be changed to correspond to a “correct” or “natural” order. And finally, in both groups these voices could not gain large acceptance and the unusual structure of the work (in a move that can be seen as an instance of *lectio difficilior* on a large scale) was mostly given preference as representing the “correct” and “authentic” one.

Further, in both traditional and modern Buddhist philology we see awareness of multiple interpretations of the *PV* by various commentators. Especially in Yamāri’s case we observe an awareness of what one might call *Rezeptionsgeschichte* or a biography of the text, beginning already in Dharmakīrti’s lifetime with his personal disciple Devendrabuddhi and ending very close to Yamāri’s own time with Jayanta and some unnamed commentators. However, the different interpretations of the text are not all seen as equally valid, and there is no attempt to “make sense” of them, but to refute them in order to retrieve the original form and intention of the text.

Concerning the form, Yamāri’s comments go well beyond a discussion of variant readings, interlineal or marginal notes, etc., and can be considered as a short philological treatise concerning the structure and scope of the *PV*. This discussion comes in addition to an immediately preceding discussion on the so-called *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* where Yamāri

31. This is certainly imaginable, for instance, in a hostile commentary that would attempt to refute the text commented on; for instance, one could imagine a Buddhist commentary on a *Mīmāṃsā* treatise or vice versa doing so. However, to my knowledge, no such commentary exists in Indian philosophy, certainly not in the classical period. We know of some Jaina commentaries on Buddhist texts, but they do not involve Jaina philosophical presuppositions and attempt only to explain the texts they comment on.

elaborates on the topic (*abhidheya*) and purpose (*prayojana*) of the PV. Discussions of *anubandhacatuṣṭaya*, which are found mainly but not only in Buddhist and Vedānta texts, have received hardly any attention from modern scholarship and should form an important element in our discussions of traditional Indian philology.³²

Pollock also mentions the *querelle* between the philologist as editor and the philologist as interpreter. Yamāri, as other commentators mentioned above, is to some extent both, but mainly the latter. However, in his case, we should also consider the philologist as a historian of thought. One of the pleasant features of Yamāri's introduction to the PV and PVA is his frequent mention of other philosophers by name. On the Buddhist side, next to Dignāga, Dharmakīrti (*ācārya*,³³ *ācāryakīrti*, *kīrti*, *vārttikakāra* and *bhāṣyakāra*³⁴) and Prajñākaragupta (also as *bhāṣyakāra*), Devendrabuddhi (*ācāryadevendra* etc.), Dharmottara, Kamalaśīla, Ravigupta and Jayanta are mentioned several times; Jñānaśrīmitra, Yamāri's teacher, so far only once as *mitrapāda*;³⁵ on the rival side, Akṣapāda, Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Akalaṅka and a certain Vardhamāna are mentioned. It is clear that Yamāri had the entire commentarial tradition on Dharmakīrti's oeuvre in mind (not only the PV, but especially also the PVin, which is mentioned by name and quoted several times) when he composed his own commentary, and he also made it clear where his preferences lay. As we have seen above, he believes that Dignāga was overestimated by Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi; elsewhere (in passages not discussed here) he is critical of Dharmottara for his brevity and for ignoring the religious dimensions in Dharmakīrti's thought;³⁶ in the discussion of the

32. Oddly, the topic of *anubandhacatuṣṭaya* is almost completely absent in a volume of essays dedicated to *śāstrārambha*, see Slaje (2008); as far as I can see, the relevant discussions in Buddhist texts are not mentioned there at all.

33. When *ācārya* appears alone, it always refers to Dharmakīrti.

34. This designation is used when he refers to Dharmakīrti as the author of the PVS, otherwise it is used for Prajñākaragupta.

35. At the time of writing, only 119 folios of the 204 that form the commentary on the *Pramānasiddhi*-chapter are available to us.

36. See for instance Ms. 13b1-2: *samudāyasyābhidheyaṃ tāvat vṛttikāraḥ pramāṇa-samuccayaṃ manyate. ṭikākāras tu pramāṇaṃ mukhyam, ānuṣaṅgikaṃ tu pramāṇasamuccaya-samarthanam. pramāṇaṃ ca sāmvyavahārikam eva, na tu lokottaraṃ bhagavadrūpam. prayojanaṃ ca vañcanāvināktāṃ pānāvagāhādīprāptim, na punar abhyudayaniḥśreyasayoḥ prāptim manyate.* "To begin with, the Vṛttikāra (Devendrabuddhi) thinks that the topic of the whole [*Pramānavārttika*] is the *Pramānasamuccaya*. The Ṭikākāra (Dharmottara), however, [thinks that] *pramāṇa* [in general] is the main [topic], but a corroboration/vindication of

anubandhacatuṣṭaya, or perhaps better, of the initial statement (*ādivākya*), he explicitly criticizes Dharmottara, Kamalaśīla, Jayanta and others. In each case, he also reports their opinion either by a direct quotation or by a close paraphrase.

Yamāri is also aware that the text he comments on has a history of transmission that produced textual variants. We do not know how many manuscripts he had at his disposal, but he certainly used more than one as is clear from comments such as ... *ity api kvacit pāṭhaḥ*. One has to note, however, that the notation of variant readings plays only a marginal role in Yamāri's comments. The reason is, I believe, because Prajñākaragupta's text was relatively well transmitted. We do not know how often such demanding texts as the PVA were studied and copied, but we can safely assume that it was neither copied nor studied very frequently.

Neither in the case of the PV nor in that of the PVA nor of any other work of the Buddhist epistemological tradition can we speak of regional recensions. This is no doubt partly due to the fact that only a small number of manuscripts (not seldom only one) are available to us. But we also have no evidence to assume that if the number of manuscripts at our disposal would have been larger, regional recensions would have emerged. South India seems, at least at present, irrelevant for manuscripts of Buddhist epistemological tradition, but we are also not able to discern regional differences between Eastern and Western regions such as Bihar and Kashmir. The only case in which we could truly speak of the conscious creation of a new recension in the Buddhist epistemological tradition is that of the PV, and this is not due to repeated copying, but to the irksome order of chapters. The new recension, as we know, was not unsuccessful, and indeed the only commentary on all four chapters of the PV that survived in Sanskrit is Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti*. Consequently, almost all Sanskrit editions of the PV follow the new recension, which may be as late as the 11th century.³⁷

the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* follows by implication. And [he thinks that] *pramāṇa* [discussed by Dharmakīrti] appertains only to everyday practice; it is not [*pramāṇa*] beyond this world that has the nature of the Buddha. And he thinks that the purpose [of Dharmakīrti's writings] is the attainment of [water for] drinking, bathing, etc., which is brought about without deception, not the attainment of good rebirth and liberation." One is reminded of Stcherbatsky's division of Dharmakīrti's commentators into three schools, the philosophical founded by Devendrabuddhi, the philosophical founded by Dharmottara and the religious one by Prajñākaragupta.

37. The only exception is Sāṅkṛtyāyana's edition of the verses alone, which is very

Among other familiar criteria used by philologists in both the European and Chinese traditions such as style, narrative, coherence and decorum, coherence is of course of utmost importance and was explicitly invoked by Dharmakīrti himself when commenting on Dignāga.³⁸ Decorum, on the other hand, is never used, to my knowledge, by Yamāri or in Buddhist philosophical literature in general, and stylistic analysis and narrative are also rather rare.³⁹ Further, even coherence is not usually used as an argument to modify or reach a more authentic text, but in order to interpret an established text; commentators generally do not also act as editors at the same time, except perhaps in a handful of cases where readings from other manuscripts are reported, and that too often without choosing the preferred reading.

seldom used.

In this connection, one may also draw attention to the relatively widespread occurrence of partial copies of manuscripts. For instance, many manuscripts of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* copy the commentary only on the first three sutras, others copy only book 5, and so on, according to the interest of the reader. Clearly, to understand the development of a certain manuscript tradition, we cannot limit ourselves to scribal and philological considerations alone, but must take into account the way these manuscripts were used. An interesting case in the Buddhist philosophical tradition is the so-called *Vādashānāni* (the title is uncertain) of Jitāri. This work consisted of an unknown number of chapters, each written as a short independent treatise on topics that were a matter of debate between Buddhists, Brahmin philosophers and Jainas, such as the existence of universals, the proofs of the existence of God, the validity of the Veda, momentariness, Selflessness, philosophy of language, the Anekāntavāda, backward causation (on this chapter see Franco 2015) and so on. We know of four manuscripts of this work: one consisting of a single chapter, the second of two, the third of eleven and the fourth of twenty. Obviously, how many and which chapters were copied in a given manuscript depended on the particular needs and interests of the teacher or student who performed or commissioned the copying. Whether we should consider widely diverging partial copies, which may also rearrange the order of chapters, as different recensions is perhaps a matter of definition; I myself would be reluctant to say that in a case such as that of the *Vādashānāni* we have four recensions of Jitāri's work. For more information on this work and a diplomatic edition of its first two chapters see Chu and Franco (2016).

38. See the argument in PV 3.294, see also Hattori (1968: 96): if one interprets *taimira* in k.8b as mental cognition, Dharmakīrti says, one would have to face a contradiction with another passage in the PS.

39. As an exception, one may mention the identification of the poetic figure *antadīpaka* in the analysis of the introductory verses of the PVA; see 12b6: *antadīpakaś cāyaṃ hi kāvyaguṇaḥ* referring to *dhīr dhīyate* in PVA v. 2. Yamāri also notes that the wish to create alliteration determines Prajñākaragupta's choice of words in this verse; cf. ... *vidadhātum uddhatadhiyāṃ dhīḥ saṃvide dhīyate*. The discussion on the order of chapters can be seen, of course, as involving criteria of narrative.

Authenticity is a tacitly admitted value;⁴⁰ it cannot, however, be considered independently of the deference and reverence that one has towards the great teachers of the past, especially Dharmakīrti in our case. This deference, however, does not lead Yamāri to regard the founders of the tradition as perfect. As we have seen, he speaks openly about Dignāga's mistakes and is willing to accept, at least as a theoretical possibility, that imperfections in the composition of the PV go back to Dharmakīrti himself rather than attribute them against all evidence to his commentator Devendrabuddhi.

As Pollock correctly emphasises, "Indian philology" largely conforms to other philological traditions in assuming that texts are unitary creations embodying the intentions of a single author. However, the human failures of such a single author may also account for imperfections in composition. In the case of the PV, Yamāri points out, the author was old and lazy and therefore the work remains incomplete. Lack of unity, coherence, consistency, self-sufficiency and intelligibility can thus also be attributed to creation by a single author.

This leads us to the opposition between orality and literacy. In the case of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, there was no transition from orality to literacy; rather the two must be considered complementary to each other from the very beginning.⁴¹ The written texts were terse and could not be completely understood without an accompanying oral instruction. Further, it is not the case that orality was completely ignored by those who participated in it. As Yamāri notes, the oral tradition was defective already for Dharmakīrti's earliest commentator Devendrabuddhi (which we, as modern scholars, can confirm when we observe that he,

40. Of course, there are exceptions to this statement. It is certainly a value when one deals with the great thinkers of the past; it is certainly less valued in more entertaining literature such as the *Vetālapañcaviṃśatikā* of Śivadāsa. When one examines the manuscripts of this work, it becomes clear that the scribes felt relatively free to add, skip, summarize or expand upon it. Here too, the variations among the manuscripts cannot be explained only by repeated copying, and one has to consider how these manuscripts were used. The situation is somewhat similar to the circulation of satirical verses, say, in France during the Enlightenment. Such verses circulated only in manuscript form, for their printing would obviously have been censored, and each reader felt free to add couplets of his/her own, if he or she felt inspired to. The attempt to produce a critical edition of the *Vetālapañcaviṃśatikā* of Śivadāsa would be similar to the undertaking of a critical edition of such verses; an impossible and perhaps not quite meaningful task.

41. Dignāga, who is generally accepted as the founder of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, lived ca. 480-540.

along with all other commentators of the PV, is sometimes in the dark about the identity of Dharmakīrti's opponents). The *sampradāya* (transmission of tradition) was, as Yamāri notes, neglected by Dharmakīrti, and once lost, it could not be fully recovered. This unfortunately is not exceptional, but typical. There is not a single philosophical tradition in South Asia where the *guruśiṣyaparamparā* remained unbroken. In the Nyāya tradition, for instance, we observe that already Vātsyāyana is uncertain about the meanings of some sūtras, and similar discontinuities in oral transmissions can be observed in all the other *darśanas*, or in fact in all the other *sāstras*. We also do not have, to my knowledge, quasi-oral *pāṭhabhedas*, as observed by Pollock for the *Śatakatrayam*. Moreover, even if segments of a tradition are unbroken, the oral transmission leaves much behind, to the point that after three or four generations the tradition is lost to a considerable extent, as can be seen, for instance, in the history of Navyanyāya.

To conclude, the above considerations would hardly warrant the assumption that traditional "Indian philology" does not matter or would not matter unless we integrate it into a new kind of philology, on the contrary, and the reasons for this are well known to anyone who tries to read the ancient, and less ancient, Sanskrit texts in the original. The scholarly traditional commentaries deepen our understanding of these texts in innumerable ways. Quite frankly, we would often be lost without them.

Furthermore, the commentarial tradition in South Asia offers much more than philology, even if perceived more broadly than "making sense of texts." We may recall that most of the philosophical works in South Asia were written in the form of commentaries, and even independent treatises are very often, from the point of view of content, nothing but commentaries. In her thoughtful remarks on text, commentary and annotation in Sanskrit philosophical literature, Karin Preisendanz (2008) has pointed out various aspects of commentaries such as preservation of otherwise lost historical information, interpretational innovation, philosophical creativity, intellectual liveliness, and so on.⁴² In the case of a

42. This, however, should not make us ignore certain less appealing aspects of the philosophical commentaries. While some commentaries are highly original and philosophically innovative, many more were "unproductive"; while some preserved precious historical information, others brought about (often unintendedly) the suppression of earlier works. Here too Dharmakīrti is an excellent example; his own success and dominant position in medieval Buddhist philosophy eventually led to the disappearance of the oeuvre of almost

tradition that “does” philosophy primarily in the form of commentaries, we would be hard-pressed to draw the line where the philology stops and the philosophy begins.

ADDENDUM: YAMĀRI ON FAITHFULNESS AND NOVELTY IN COMMENTARIES

One of the most original contributions of Prajñākaragupta to Buddhist philosophy in general and to proofs of life after death in particular is his theory of backward causation or, as it is called in Sanskrit, the doctrine of the future cause (*bhāvikāraṇavāda*). Since Prajñākaragupta’s *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, is a commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, it is not surprising that Prajñākaragupta attributes this theory to Dharmakīrti, and further even to the Buddha himself in the general formulation of Dependent Origination (*asmin satīdaṃ bhavati, asyotpādād idam utpadyate*). Obviously, the doctrine of the future cause is absent in Dharmakīrti’s writings and it seems unlikely that he would have accepted it. This novelty did not escape the notice of other Buddhist philosophers and commentators,⁴³ who accused Prajñākaragupta of being unfaithful to Dharmakīrti, lit., of the fault of independence (*svātantryadoṣa*). On this point, Yamāri comes to Prajñākaragupta’s defence (Ms. 62b7f):

ācārye ca bhāṣyam etat. ācāryasya cāniṣṭam tat, kvacid anukteḥ. tataḥ svātantryadoṣo bhāṣyakārasya nidākara evety āha — yuktaṃ paśyāma iti. ayam arthaḥ — na khalu sāḥṣān noktam ity evāniṣṭaḥ. nāpi tadvaditūḥ svātantryadoṣaḥ, mūle ’nubhinnārthakathāyāḥ sarvatra darśanāt. kiṃ vā dūragamanena? vārttikoktaprapaṅcasya sarvasya pravacane sāḥṣād anukteḥ, kiṃ nāniṣṭisvātantryadoṣau? tasmāt svamatasya sādhanam avirodhi vā vicāraramyam upādeyam eveti guṇatrayayogād yuktaṃ iti.

And this [PVA] is a Bhāṣya on the Ācārya (*i.e.*, on the PV). But this [doctrine of future cause] is not acceptable for the Ācārya because it is not stated anywhere [in his writings]. Therefore, this fault of independence causes nothing but contempt for the Bhāṣyakāra

all his predecessors; even Dignāga’s work has almost entirely disappeared in the original Sanskrit and is nowadays available only in Chinese and Tibetan translations. Further examples can be easily adduced, cf. Preisendanz (2008: 611f).

43. This novelty was also noted by Jaina philosophers who refer to the *bhāvikāraṇavāda*, for instance, Anantavīrya points out that this doctrine is Prajñākaragupta’s alone, and is not accepted by other commentators of Dharmakīrti such as Dharmottara and Arcaṭa (SVT p. 196): *prajñākaraguptasyaiva mataṃ na dharmottarādīnām iti manyate*.

(i.e., Prajñākaragupta). Therefore, [the Bhāṣyakāra] says: “We see correctly” (PVA_(o) 74.5-6). The following is the meaning: Indeed, just because something is not stated directly, it does not [mean that it is] unacceptable. Nor [does it mean that] someone who says [something not directly stated] commits the fault of independence because explanations of things that do not appear in the *mūla* are observed everywhere [in all commentaries]. Why go far? Since all the details stated in the [*Pramāṇa*]vārttika are not stated directly in the Buddha’s word, doesn’t [Dharmakīrti himself commit] the dual faults of stating the unacceptable and independence? Therefore, what establishes/proves one’s own doctrine or does not contradict it [and] is pleasant in reasoning, should indeed be appropriated. Thus, because [the doctrine of the future cause] is connected to [these] three qualities, it is correct.

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INDEX

A, Ā

abhidharma, 258
ABHINAVAGUPTA, 260
ādivākya, 255, 263
AKALAŅKA, 262
AKṢAPĀDA, 262
ANANTAVĪRYA, 267
anartha, 252
apoha, 248, 252
ARCAṬA, 267
artha, 252

B, Bh

bhāvikāraṇavāda, 267
Bihar, 263
BUDDHA, 267-268

C, Ch

Cachemire, Kaśmīr, 263

D, Ḍ, Dh

DEVENDRABUDDHI, 251-259, 261-263, 265
DHARMAKĪRTI, 247-249, 251-254, 256-268
DHARMOTTARA, 262-263, 267
dhātu, 253
DIGNĀGA, 247, 250, 252-253, 255-256, 258-259, 262, 264-265, 267

H, Ḥ

Hetuprakaraṇa, 249

J

jaina, 261, 264, 267
jāti, 248, 252

JAYANTA, 250-251, 255-257, 261-263
JITĀRI, 264
JŅĀNAŚRĪMITRA, 262

K, Kh

KAMALAŚĪLA, 262-263
KARŅAKAGOMIN, 251, 254
KUMĀRILA BHATṬA, 262

M

MANORATHANANDIN, 250, 263
Mīmāṃsā, 261
mūla, *mūlagrantha*, 253, 268

N

Navyanyāya, 266
Nyāyabhāṣya, 264

P, Ph

paraṃparā, 266
PRAJŅĀKARAGUPTA, 251, 254-255, 262-264, 267-268
pramāṇa, 252-253, 255, 257-258, 262-263
Pramāṇasamuccaya, 248-250, 252-254, 257-259, 262-264
Pramāṇavārttika, 248-268
Pramāṇavārttikakroḍapattra, 253
Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra, 251, 254, 262-264, 267-268
Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭikā Supariśuddhā, 247, 250
Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā, 258
Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti, 252, 254, 260-262
Pramāṇavārttikaṭikā, 254
Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti, 263

INDEX

Pramāṇaviniścaya, 249, 262

R, Ṛ

RAVIGUPTA, 251, 254-255, 262

S, Ś, Ṣ, Ṣ

ŚĀKYABUDDHI, 250-254

sampradāya (*saṃpradāya*), 258-259, 266

śāstra, 253, 266

Śatakatrāyam, 266

Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā, 267

ŚIVADĀSA, 265

śloka, 251

stotra, 259

svārthānumāna, 248, 253-255

svātantryadoṣa, 267

U

UDDYOTAKARA, 262

V

Vādanyāya, 252

Vādashānāni, 264

VARDHAMĀNA, 262

vārttika, 250, 258

VĀTSYĀYANA, 262, 266

Vedānta, 262

Vetālapañcaviṃśatikā, 265

Y

YAMĀRI, 247, 250-251, 254-267

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Eli FRANCO. Yamāri and the Order of Chapters in the <i>Pramāṇavārttika</i>	247
The Problem	248
The Dominant Paradigm in Modern Scholarship on Dharmakīrti's Work	249
Traditional Buddhist Explanations	250
Addendum: Yamāri on Faithfulness and Novelty in Commentaries .	267