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Final Notes on the *Sadvitīyaprayoga*

Eli Franco

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Abstract The following response first points out the obvious methodological disadvantages of Oetke's decline to use both primary and secondary sources for his interpretation of the *sadvitīyaprayoga* (sp). Oetke believes that he is able to provide an "objectively adequate" presentation of the sp and describe "the objective properties" of its content without taking the historical context into account. By divorcing meaning from (historical) context, he distorts the presumed original meaning and intention of the sp, and superimposes on it an anachronistic concern with what he calls "the extrapolation principle." The second part of the response explores the usage of the term *sapakṣa* as a collective term.

Keywords Lokāyata · sophisms · *sadvitīyaprayoga* · *sapakṣa* · *pakṣasapakṣānyataratva* · Oetke

Some specialists of Indian philosophy, usually not the best ones, rely only on secondary sources, some others make important contributions while relying only on the primary sources. Claus Oetke, however, is unique inasmuch as he relies neither on primary sources nor on secondary literature. Why he proceeds in this semi-antiquarian manner remains unclear even after his latest installment on the *sadvitīyaprayoga* (hereafter sp).¹ Previous studies, notably by Tom Tillemans and

¹ Claus Oetke, "Additional Notes on the *Sadvitīyaprayoga*" *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, DOI 10.1007/s10781-014-9272-1, Published online: 06 January 2015.

As this title indicates, I do not intend to continue this controversy beyond the present round. I thank the Academy of Korean Studies (KSPS) for a generous grant funded by the Korean Government (MOE) (AKS-2012-AAZ-104).

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Takashi Iwata, dealing directly with the sp are not even read because “[i]t is difficult to see why the question of novelty with respect to the above sketched account [i.e., Oetke’s account of sp] should possess much relevance... Since my primary aim ought not lie in achieving novelty for its own sake but rather in presenting some account which is objectively adequate I do not recognize any compelling reason to pursue the question of originality and confine myself to merely pointing out a consequence which *would* result *if* the above delineated explication were identical with some previous accounts. For under such premises one can assume that the writer of FS [= Franco] has not merely failed to adequately grasp the explanation offered by me, but also failed to grasp elucidations presented in previous investigations. Thus one wonders what the use of reading secondary literature on a topic should be if this is the outcome” (p. 511). Never mind the arrogance; what is Oetke actually saying? That if one does not aim at novelty for its own sake, one can repeat what was already stated before by other scholars without mentioning them?² And what does he want us to infer? That since *my* reading of previous studies was useless because of my stupidity, *he* does not have to read them? How does this follow?

So much for secondary literature. For the question why Oetke declines to read primary sources, especially the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* which is our most important source for understanding the sp, I have found no direct answer. The closest is probably the following common-place. “It should be indisputable, however, that the mere fact that later critics did not attribute to the argument precisely this function³ [i.e., revealing problems of induction, EF] cannot be used to dismiss from the outset the supposition that it was an originally intended one. Particularly as far as Dharmakīrti is concerned, one cannot presume that he must have treated the *sadvitīyaprayoga* as an argument questioning the validity of induction, given that it was originally intended as such. At least as far as one type of inferences acknowledged in Dharmakīrti’s doctrine, viz. that relying on *kāryahetu*-s, is concerned, it crucially relies on a hidden extrapolation whose exposure could call into question his entire theoretical system. It should not be deemed highly probable that a philosopher highlights the general significance of a problem which underlies his own teaching in a concealed manner” (p. 520).

Given that the work where the sp was expounded for the first time is lost, and since all later sources cannot be trusted, on what original source materials is Oetke’s interpretation based? Obviously, on none at all. Welcome to a new type of scholarship that does not require one to be up-to-date in one’s field, saves one a lot of work, and allows one to be very productive, at least as far as the quantity is concerned. However, I have a small problem with this kind of scholarship. If Oetke distrusts the primary sources up to the point of declining to read them, how could he understand the sp? Oetke naively but sincerely thinks that he can provide an “objectively adequate” presentation (p. 510, see also p. 521 “the objective properties of the content of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*”) of the sp without taking the historical

² I did not claim, of course, that everything stated in Oetke’s paper has been said before, but only that what I consider correct in it is not new (*sadvitīyatva* = *arthāntaratva*), and what is new in it (“the extrapolation principle”), I consider wrong.

³ One wonders how Oetke knows that “later critics did not attribute to the argument precisely this function” without reading them.

context into account. He is then genuinely surprised that I call his interpretation anachronistic and ahistorical.

Perhaps I was wrong to label Oetke's statements "ahistorical." Actually, his statements are "anti-historical" for he does not only ignore the historical evidence, but also contradicts it, though perhaps unknowingly. For instance, Oetke chooses to believe that the criteria of validity embodied in the doctrine of *trairūpya* are "pretty insignificant" (p. 509) for "the actual intentions" of the author of the sp (how did he learn about them?). However, this statement is contradicted, explicitly or implicitly, by all the authors (not just Dharmakīrti) who discuss the sp.

Oetke's criticism on this point in his "Additional Notes" is pure sophistry. He first distinguishes two meanings of the word "ahistorical"—one of which is entirely irrelevant to the discussion—and then accuses me of "the fundamental flaw" (p. 513) of confusing and conflating the two meanings. Far from conflating the two, I used the word "ahistorical" in the pertinent sense of "disregarding historical circumstances relevant for a proper assessment of some phenomenon" (p. 513). It should have been obvious to Oetke that disregarding primary historical sources relevant for the assessment of the sp is nothing but disregarding evidence for the historical circumstances relevant for their assessment. But obviously it isn't, so let me explain further.

The main difference between Oetke's interpretation and mine concerns the purport of the inference. Is it about the "extrapolation principle," as Oetke claims, or about the negation of inference as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) because each inference can be annulled by a contradictory inference? Now, if one does not disregard historical circumstances relevant for the settlement of this issue, this would involve questions such as: In what context does the sp appear for the first time? To what time can the formulation of the sp be dated? When is the "extrapolation principle" first addressed in the Indian philosophical tradition? Is the Lokāyata tradition, with which the sp is affiliated, concerned with the "extrapolation principle"? This is the kind of questions Oetke fails even to raise. What we get instead are his usual speculations about "possibilities" utterly devoid of any regard for the historical context, for instance on p. 509: "For there is no conclusive evidence showing that the original proponents were acquainted with the concept of *viruddhāvyabhicāra*,⁴ and as long as this is not definitely established one has to reckon with the possibility that, the other way round, the doctrinal element of *viruddhāvyabhicāra* was created as a reaction facing the problem of the *sadvitīyaprayoga*."⁵

What Oetke fails to grasp, also in some of his earlier publications, is that the bare pointing out of a possibility is not quite enough. Our task as historians of Indian thought, as I see it, is to adduce some concrete evidence that a mere theoretical "possibility" is

⁴ I am not sure whether Oetke understood me on this point. I do not (and did not) claim that the sp is an inference involving a *viruddhāvyabhicārihetu*, but that it creates a similar situation, namely, of two "valid" inferences that contradict each other. Unlike the case of *viruddhāvyabhicāra*, however, where two different reasons are used to establish the contradictory theses, in the case of the sp the same reason can be used for this purpose.

⁵ See also p. 509: "It has never been conclusively refuted that this [i.e., "the 'materialist' tenet that persons are nothing but bodies manifesting phenomena of consciousness"; EF] actually was an originally intended purpose of this reasoning." See also pp. 520–521 where Oetke states that the "inventor" of the sp "intended to cast a critical light on prevalent accounts of inductive reasonings and to support the theorem of materialism."

also a probability, or even an actuality, to point out some historical, i.e., textual evidence for it. But how could Oetke do so without reading the relevant sources?

So let us “reckon with the possibility” in Oetke’s lieu. Admittedly, the questions I raised above cannot be answered with absolute certainty because we know so little about the *trairūpya* theory before Dignāga. Yet, the fact that the evidence is scant does not justify ignoring or contradicting it. Considering the evidence at hand, I would say that the sp has to be dated to the time between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. It presupposes a theory of *trairūpya* as we know it from Dignāga’s writings, and it also presupposes that the *trairūpya* theory had been accepted widely or even established as a norm, in order for it to be worthwhile to compose sophisms directed against it.⁶ To the best of my knowledge, the theory of *trairūpya* became widely spread and accepted in Indian philosophy after Dignāga, precisely due to the wide influence of his work. In addition, the argument from silence, although not decisive, certainly carries some weight here. The fact that Dharmakīrti discusses the sp very extensively, whereas Dignāga as well as Uddyotakara and all other philosophers who predate Dharmakīrti are completely silent about it, also indicates that the sp must be assigned to the period between the two philosophers. Further, if we date the sp to the time between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, we can reasonably assume that the doctrine of *viruddhāvyabhicāra* was well known to the author of the sp.

Oetke would presumably claim that “one has to reckon with the possibility” that the sp predates Dignāga. This is not likely, but also not impossible. However, such an assumption becomes improbable when one considers that concern with the “extrapolation principle” does not become apparent in Indian philosophy before the seventh century. I fail to see this concern in Dignāga’s writings; and even in the works of Uddyotakara and Praśastapāda, composed a generation or two after Dignāga, the problem is not yet discussed. To my knowledge, the first philosophers who deal with the “extrapolation principle” are Dharmakīrti’s older contemporaries Īśvarasena and Kumāri. Oetke cannot have it both ways. If the sp deals with the “extrapolation principle,” it is probably later than Dignāga, indeed probably closer to Dharmakīrti’s time, and the doctrinal element of *viruddhāvyabhicāra* was well known to its author and certainly not “created as a reaction facing the problem of the sadvītyāprayoga.” Vice versa, if the sp would have been composed before Dignāga, for which assumption we do not have a shred of evidence, it is highly improbable that it dealt with the “extrapolation principle.” And if Oetke wants us to change our idea about the historical development of the “extrapolation principle” in Indian philosophy, he will have to do more than just ask us to “reckon with the possibility.”

Moreover, even if the author of the sp were not aware of the concept of *viruddhāvyabhicāra*, it would still be ludicrous to assume that he believed that he could actually prove the materialistic Lokāyata tenet with it (see p. 509). Yet Oetke presumes this to be—what else?—a possibility. But it is obvious, also according to Oetke’s interpretation, that if the sp is valid, the following is equally valid: The pot is accompanied by a pot or by an eternal soul, because it is not a lotus, etc. On what is Oetke “possibility” based? As far as I can see, on no historical evidence

⁶ Lest I be misunderstood on this point as well, I use the word “sophism” here, and in my previous notes on the sp, in the sense of an argument that complies with the formal requirements for a valid argument, in our case the requirements of the *trairūpya* theory, and yet arrives at an absurd or inadmissible conclusion.

whatsoever. Perhaps we should also “reckon with the possibility” that the author of the sp did not understand the most obvious implications of what he was saying.

Furthermore, how do the respective interpretations fit within the Lokāyata tradition? One has to recall the well-known facts that the rejection of inference as *pramāṇa* appears already in the *Bṛhaspatīsūtra* and has been a constant concern in the Lokāyata tradition,⁷ that this denial was directed against inferences of metaphysical entities such as eternal soul (*ātman*), eternal God (*īśvara*), karma, and so forth, and not against inductive reasoning or the “extrapolation principle” (e. g., the inference from smoke from fire).⁸ In other words, my interpretation of the fragment fits well with what we know about the Lokāyata tradition and the historical development of Indian philosophy at the presumed date of the fragment. Oetke’s interpretation, on the other hand, has no historical evidence in its favor, is divorced from any historical context, and is, therefore, anachronistic and ahistorical.

This does not mean, of course, that the theory of *trairūpya* as we know it from Dignāga’s writings does not involve inductive reasoning (not necessarily non-monotonic logic, as Oetke would have it⁹), but the concern of the sp is not the uncertainty involved in inductive reasoning, but is much more radical: it aims at showing that the theory of *trairūpya* is completely useless because it allows anything and everything to be proved. The sp does not “reveal problems of induction” (p. 520). It reveals problems in the theory of *trairūpya*,¹⁰ and these problems arise from the formal requirement that the *pakṣa* should not be a part of the domains of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Significantly, the sp itself is not a piece of inductive reasoning in any current sense of the term.

Concerning the issue of *vyāpti*, I already pointed out that Oetke confuses and conflates two terminological and conceptual levels of discourse. While the discussion whether the *pakṣa* should be included in or excluded from the domains of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* is well known and well documented, the issue whether the *pakṣa* should be excluded from the *vyāpti* seems to be a novelty discovered by Oetke. When challenged to produce a single text passage as evidence for such a discussion, Oetke is unable to produce any. He now claims that the distinction is not important (“loses decisive relevance” p. 6),¹¹ and goes on confusing the conditions

⁷ Cf. the survey in Franco, “Lokāyata.” *Brill’s Encyclopedia of Hinduism*, Vol. III, pp. 629–642, Leiden 2011.

⁸ Of course, such inferences are equally rejected by the Laukāyatikas in their blanket rejection of inference, but it is clear that this is not their concern. Later Laukāyatikas like Purandara accepted the use of worldly inferences, while denying inferences of metaphysical entities; cf. Franco, “Paurandarasūtra.” In: M.A. Dhaky and Sagarmal Jain (eds.), *Aspects of Jainology, Vol. III, Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania Felicitation Volume I*, Varanasi 1991: 154–163.

⁹ Cf. John Taber, “Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic?” *Philosophy East and West* 54, 2004: 143–170.

¹⁰ In other words, Oetke confuses the criticism of a specific theory of inductive reasoning with a criticism of inductive reasoning.

¹¹ He also claims that the fact that no textual source offers “direct evidence” (but he also does not mention indirect evidence) “cannot be employed as an argument” that the exclusion of the *pakṣa* was not the case. But surely, this does not allow us to claim that this was the case, as Oetke does. Nor does Oetke provide any evidence that his claim that the exclusion of the *pakṣa* was an unstated presupposition “during certain historical periods”, which he does not further specify. Further, I am not sure what Oetke means by “biographical perspective” (see p. 512).

of *trairūpya* with those of a *vyāpti*. Perhaps because of this confusion he fails to grasp what I say and deems it “mysterious” and “puzzling” (p. 511). For my part, I do not understand why Oetke misunderstands my basically simple statement. Since he is such a stickler for formalization, let me remind him of the De Morgan laws, and further that in the formulation of the *vyatireka* the *sādhya* is negated, and that we both agree on two points: that in the case of the *sp*, a double negation equals affirmation and that *sadvitīyatva* is equivalent to being something else (*arthāntaratva*). Let P stand for something’s being a pot, and Q for something’s being a conscious body.

Thus, the *sādhya* can be represented as

$$(\neg P) \vee (\neg Q) = \neg(P \wedge Q)$$

and its negation would be

$$\neg(\neg(P \wedge Q)) = P \wedge Q$$

which means that the negated *sādhya* amounts to “being pot and conscious body,” and the *vyatireka* could be formulated as follows: “whatever is a pot and a conscious body is a lotus.” Now, since Oetke wants to exclude the *pakṣa* (which I take to be all pots) from the *vyāpti*, the *vyatireka* would be “whatever is a conscious body is a lotus,” which is exactly what I said. And even if Oetke were right in claiming that the *pakṣa* is only a single individual pot, the *vyatireka* would still be untenable.

If I understand him correctly, Oetke considers in his “Appraisal” that the subject of the inference is an individual pot (which he calls, in the “Additional Notes” p. 508, E1). This interpretation is not only linguistically awkward, but, again, ahistorical, or anti-historical, for it contradicts the evidence at hand, in this case a statement by Śākyabuddhi that the subject of inference is all pots. Of course, I do not mean to say that Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation has to be accepted on faith, but that it constitutes historical evidence and has to be taken into consideration, weighing it together with and against other evidence. Ignoring it, as Oetke proudly and overconfidently does, means ignoring historical evidence and thereby being ahistorical.

My suggestion to take the difference implied in the *sp* as a qualitative difference was indeed partly motivated by the wish to conform to Śākyabuddhi’s statement. In his “Additional Notes,” Oetke considers the possibility that the subject of the inference is indeed all pots (what he calls E2), still without consideration of Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation. If Oetke would opt for this alternative, then we would have no quarrel, for this would agree with the historical evidence, and as he himself admits (p. 510), numerical difference in this case implies qualitative difference, albeit as a secondary outcome. Yet Oetke does not tell us whether he thinks that E1 is more plausible than E2 or not. Actually, he does not seem to care.

Concerning the usage of *anyatara*, let me note first that I am well aware of the fact that certain linguists and philosophers consider that the exclusiveness of a disjunction in natural languages does not arise from the disjunction itself, but from the nature of the disjuncts (cf. my *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, Wien 1997, p. 46). I am now thrilled to know that Oetke sides with these linguists, but this is hardly relevant to the interpretation of the *sp*. Unlike what Oetke thinks, I do

consider that the word *anyatara* can refer to an exclusive or inclusive disjunction; I indicated that, admittedly not clearly enough, by putting the word “only” in brackets: “(only) one of the two.” Even though I was certainly not explicit enough on this point because my concern was a different one, I dare say that had Oetke bothered to read my note more attentively, he would not have thought that I consider the word *anyatara* to refer only to an exclusive disjunction, for I said (pp. 222–223): “However, when Dharmakīrti says *sāmānyena* (‘in general’) as in *sādhyam sāmānyena sammatam* (PV 4.34), *sāmānyena sādhyam iṣṭam iti na viśeṣāpekṣaḥ* (PVin III 14.9) or similar expressions, he probably simply means that the disjunction should be taken as inclusive ‘or’ i.e., is considered true if the one, the other or both its members are true, disregarding whether it is the one or the other ‘particular’ (i.e., the person or the pot).”

My concern was to explain the way the word *anyatara* is used in the sp; to describe its function I coined the term “alternating disjunction” precisely because I wanted to avoid using the terms “exclusive” and “inclusive” disjunction. However, Oetke misunderstood me on this point as well and oddly claims that what I mean with this term “is sometimes called exclusive disjunction” (pp. 516–517). This is obviously not what I meant. To use Oetke’s own example, when one says “Your child will be either a boy or a girl”, one normally means (barring of course the rare case of later sex change) that the child will be either a boy and never a girl, or a girl and never a boy, and not that under certain circumstances it will be a boy and under other circumstances a girl. There is no reason at all to equate my “alternating disjunction” with the function of an exclusive “or.” In fact, one can interpret the disjunction to refer to the fact that under certain circumstances only (a) occurs, under other circumstances only (b), and under still other circumstances both.

Concerning the *pakṣasapakṣānyataratva* argument, it may seem futile and tedious to go on arguing whether one should translate “the *sapakṣa*” or “a *sapakṣa*.” However, Oetke’s explanation reveals an important difference in interpretation between us that goes far beyond the topic of the sp. According to Oetke, if I understand him correctly, the term *sapakṣa* must refer to an individual thing that possesses the property to be proved. In other words, an inference such as “sound is impermanent because it is produced” has an infinite number of *sapakṣas*. I, on the other hand, assumed, and still assume, that at least during the historical period when the *pakṣasapakṣānyataratva* inference was conceived (i.e., also between Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s times), the term *sapakṣa* was used as a collective term. The thing adduced as the so-called positive example is only an instantiation of the *sapakṣa*, or better, a part (*ekadeśa*) of it.

It is interesting to note that at least during the period when the sp and the *pakṣasapakṣānyataratva* inferences were put forward and discussed, reflected in the writings of Dignāga, Śāṅkarasvāmin, Uddyotakara, Praśastapāda, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti, the words *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* never seem to be used in the plural. This already indicates that *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* were used, if not exclusively than predominantly as collective terms. Of course, the mere usage in the singular is not, in itself, enough for such a conclusion. The usual formulation of the second condition of the *trairūpya* (*sapakṣe sattvam, sapakṣe vṛttiḥ*) involves a certain

ambiguity. One can certainly understand it, as Oetke seems to, as referring to existence/presence/occurrence in **a** *sapakṣa*, and not in **the** *sapakṣa*.¹² However, the formulation of the third condition leaves no room for such an ambiguity. If the word *vipakṣa* were not used as a collective term, the formulation *vipakṣe 'sattvam* would not be adequate because it would leave open the possibility that the reason exists in another *vipakṣa*. Therefore, if one wishes to maintain that the terms *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are used in a similar manner in the formulation of the *trairūpya*, one has to consider them as collective terms. Further evidence indicates such a usage. As is well known, some reasons are not present in the entire domain of the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, and are said to be both present and absent in the *sapakṣa* or the *vipakṣa*, e. g., in the *Hetucakraḍamaru* (cf. e.g., v. 2: *yod dang med dang gnyis ka yi l*). In these cases, the interpretation presupposed by Oetke seems improbable. One cannot understand “both presence and absence in **a** (single/one) *sapakṣa*.” Rather, we must understand “both presence and absence in **the** (domain of) *sapakṣa*,” which again implies a single collective *sapakṣa*.

Further, I may add that when the second and third conditions of the *trairūpya* are discussed, I have never seen statements such as *katipayeṣu/keṣucit sapakṣeṣu sattvam*, or *katipayeṣu/keṣucid vipakṣeṣv asattvam*, and so on. Oetke is of course welcome to provide some examples to the contrary. I do not claim, of course, that the words *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* were exclusively used as collective terms at all times and in all philosophical traditions. A search through a large number of electronic texts¹³ resulted in only four sentences where the word *sapakṣa* appears in the plural. However, even without such search, it is amply clear that the usage in the singular is by far the predominant one. It is also clear that if Oetke's position were adopted, statements regarding the second and third conditions of the *trairūpya* would be ambiguous and would necessitate more cumbersome formulations.

Furthermore, the common expressions *sapakṣaikadeśavṛtti* and *vipakṣaikadeśavṛtti* (*Nyāyapraveśa* [Dhruva's ed.] p. 4.2–3, 4.10, 4.16, etc.; *Nyāyavārttika* [Thakur's ed.] 129.4) would make no sense if the terms *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* were not understood to refer to an entire domain; the above expressions can certainly not be understood as “presence in a part of **a** (individual) *sapakṣa*.” Rather they indicate that the *sapakṣa* is a whole, of which the individual things that possesses the property to be proved are parts. Similarly, when Dharmakīrti says that the *kāryahetu* has a double or two-fold residence (i.e., presence and absence) in the *sapakṣa*, it is clear that he uses the term *sapakṣa* to refer to an entire domain, e.g., in PVin III 50.1: *tasmāt sapakṣe dvidividhāvṛtti kāryam*.

The reason why the words *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are so widely used as collective terms can be traced back to the decisive influence of Dignāga's work. In a well-known statement in the *Nyāyamukha*, Dignāga says (Tucci's translation, p. 31): “Moreover, in the above definition of the characteristics of the valid reason etc., I have always used the singular case, in order to show that each of the notions [thus

¹² Similarly, in the definition of *sapakṣa*—*sādhyadharmasāmānyena samāno 'rthaḥ sapakṣaḥ*—one can read **a** *sapakṣa* or **the** *sapakṣa*, and of course also the word *artha* can be and has been understood in various ways, but there is no need to enter into this issue here. See Tom Tillemans, On *Sapakṣa*. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 18, 1990, pp. 53–79.

¹³ I thank Horst Lasic for his assistance and thoughtful remarks on this issue.

defined] belongs to one single class.” Tucci (n. 58 thereon) identified and quoted a parallel passage from the Tibetan translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* III 22a.¹⁴ Professor Katsura has kindly sent me his Sanskrit reconstruction of this passage; the words set in Roman are attested in Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary, the words in Italics are reconstructed from the Tibetan:

atra ca sarveṣu hetvādīlakṣaṇeṣu

vivakṣitaikasaṅkhyatvam (PS III 22a)

jātau padārthe jñeyam iti śeṣaḥ / atra caikasaṅkhyo yaḥ “tatra yaḥ san saḥajātīya” ityevamādiḥ sa vivakṣitaḥ /

“And here, in all characteristics of the reason and so on,

Being in the singular, which is intended,

The remainder [of the statement in the verse] is ‘should be understood to refer to a class (*jāti*), inasmuch as it is the object of a word.’ [That is,] and here (i.e., in the previous passages), [words] in the singular number, such as [in the statement] ‘there, [the reason] being present in [the] similar,’ are intended.”

Dignāga explains here the use of the singular in the characterisations of the reason and so on. Clearly, in the example he gives for these, **saḥajātīye* is equivalent to *sapakṣe*; in PSVb, it is even translated as *mthun phyogs la*. Thus, what Dignāga is saying with this example is that in the formulation of the second characteristic of the reason as “existence in the *saḥajātīya/sapakṣa*,” and not as “existence in (some/all) *saḥajātīyas/sapakṣas*,” the word *saḥajātīya/sapakṣa* in the singular does not refer to a specific individual, but to a (single) class or a collective (*jāti*), i.e., the class of all things that possess the property to be proved.¹⁵

The use of the terms *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* in the singular is also apparent in Dharmakīrti’s works. For him, *pakṣa*, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are not particulars

¹⁴ PSVa, Narthang 51a1 (= Derge 46a7f.): *gtan tshigs la sogs pa 'di dag thams cad la yang brjod par 'dod pa'i grangs gcig nyid / rigs dang rdzas las shes par bya'o / zhes pa'i tshig gi lha rna'o / gang yang grangs gcig ces pa ni 'dir gang rigs dang mthun par yod pa'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa de brjod par 'dod pa ste /*

PSVb, Narthang 133a6 (not included in the Derge, Peking 132a2f.): *'dir yang gtan tshigs la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid thams cad la / grangs gcig la ni rigs pa yin no / dngos po'i rigs la shes par bya'o zhes bya ba ni tshig gi lhag ma'o / 'dir yang grangs gcig pa der gang mthun phyogs la yod dang / zhes bya ba de lta bu sogs pa rnam la de rigs pa yin no /*

¹⁵ Although the word *jāti* is more commonly used to refer to a universal, it is probably not used in this meaning here, for it does not make sense to say that a (concrete) reason is present in an (abstract) universal, e.g., that smoke is present in the universal fire. See also Tucci’s translation quoted above. The use of the word *jāti* for the class, i.e., the entirety of all individuals forming a class, has been noted by Preisendanz in relation to NS 2.2.67; cf. her *Studien zu Nyāyasūtra III.1*, p. 660: “... könnte mit *jāti* auch konkret die Gesamtheit der Einzeldinge gemeint sein, die durch den Besitz einer gewissen *ākṛti* eine Gruppe bilden.” She also refers to Randle, *Indian Logic*, p. 133: “[A passage in the NS] distinguishes the class (*jāti*) from the individuals (*vyakti*) ...”

Note also that the above passage of the PSV was used, presumably by Īśvarasena, in order to establish the fifth characteristic of a valid reason, namely, that the reason itself (not just the elements of its characterizations as in Dignāga’s text above) also has to be in the singular in the singular (see Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti’s Hetubinduḥ*, Wien 1967, Vol. 1, p. 91f., Vol. 2, p. 73f.).

(*svalakṣaṇa*), but forms (*ākāra*) that appear in conceptual cognitions; i.e., these forms are objects of words and can be based on existing things, non-existing things, or both.¹⁶ Further, when rejecting the exclusion of the *pakṣa* from the *sapakṣa* and *vīpakṣa*, Dharmakīrti clearly implies that these three terms refer to groups or classes (PVin III 102.3–102.4): *tasmād anapekṣitapakṣavyavasthitau dharmāṅām vṛttivyatirakau parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇau na trīyaṃ rāṣim vyatirecataḥ*. “Therefore, the occurrence and absence of the properties [to be proved], both of which are established as independent of the *pakṣa*, inasmuch as they are characterize as abiding firmly in mutual exclusion, they do not lie beyond (i.e., are not divorced from) the third group (i.e., the *pakṣa*).”

Therefore, the above quoted passages clearly show that the usage of the term *sapakṣa* as a collective term was, if not mandatory, at least very common, and thus, in his insisting on changing the translation from “the *sapakṣa*” to “a *sapakṣa*,” Oetke only succeeds to convince us, yet again, that he has long lost touch with the original Sanskrit sources.

Finally, the icing on the cake is Oetke’s contention that not only I (and by implication other Indologists who are not worth reading), but also the Indian tradition—in short, everybody except Oetke—marginalize not only the author and proponents of the sp,¹⁷ but also some undisclosed “schools of thought which were marginalized in the Indian tradition” (p. 508). The reason why I marginalize the sp is presumably that I was attempting to ascertain “the function for which it [viz., the sp] was intended” (p. 522). Similarly, I am also guilty of *not* “leaving out of account the question of who has advocated those propositions [such as the sp] and what those who proclaimed them before intended to achieve by them” (ibid.). In spite of Oetke’s remarks, I still consider these to be legitimate and important tasks of historians of Indian philosophy, without claiming, of course, that these are the only legitimate goal.¹⁸ It goes without saying that everybody (Oetke included) is entitled to his or her free associations and ruminations triggered by the sp. But this is not what Oetke claims to do. He rather believes that he investigates the sp and “other theorems under the aspect of what they objectively entail” (ibid.). However, how could he possibly know what the sp “objectively entails” without understanding its meaning? And how could he understand its meaning without considering it in its historical context? These are questions that Oetke has neither answer nor concern for. And if by chance the Indian tradition contradicts Oetke’s “objective” entailments, it is the tradition which is at fault, and one can surmise “the existence of a defect pertaining to the manner in which a tradition dealt with its own heritage.

¹⁶ Cf. Takashi Iwata, “The Negative Concomitance (*vyatireka*) in the Case of Inconclusive (*anaikāntika*) Reasons.” In: Sh. Katsura et al. (ed.), *The Role of the Example (dṛṣṭānta) in Classical Indian Logic*. Wien 2004: 91–134, on p. 106 with references to the PVSV and PVin III.

¹⁷ See p. 522: “Thus in contrast to what is suggested in FS I maintain that it is improper to dismiss the *sadvitīyaprayoga* as a sophistic fallacy and marginalize its creators and proponents.” I do not know why my effort to make sense of the sp and calling it brilliant and funny gave Oetke the impression that I was dismissing it. On the contrary, I attempted to show that the sp indicates a genuine problem in the theory of *trairūpya*.

¹⁸ Who in his right mind would object to the position that various texts can be used for different purposes? See Oetke’s trivial deliberations on pp. 522–523.

One can go even a step further and surmise that an overriding goal of marginalizing other teachings contributed to that neglect” (ibid.). Furthermore, “[i]t is not eccentric to presume that a widespread attitude aiming at marginalization at the expense of exploring theoretical potential was a decisive factor resulting in an inferiority of Indian philosophy” (ibid.).

So what can we do in order to demarginalize Indian philosophy and rescue it from its inferiority? Work like Oetke, of course: ignore the primary sources, scorn the secondary sources (without reading them), divorce meaning from intention, and intention from context, stop doing independent research and spend our time writing obnoxious diatribes against our fellow indologists, write in a hardly intelligible manner so that very few people would be able to read us, and even fewer would care to, fill page after page with vacuous speculations on either trivial or improbable “possibilities,” use formalizations that flatten and distort the statements they are supposed to represent, and last but not least, display our arrogance and contempt of our colleagues. All this would no doubt take us a giant step forward.

*[With the publication of this paper we hope to end this debate here. The Editor.]